Trending in History and Philosophy of Physics
Observational Indistinguishability and the Beginning of the Universe
Can we infer whether all of physical reality began to exist? Several novel results are offered suggesting a negative verdict. First, a common strategy for defending a cosmic beginning involves showing that individual beginningless cosmological models are implausible. This strategy is shown to make an elementary error in confirmation theory. Second, two necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) conditions are offered for a cosmic beginning. Third, three extensions are offered to the Malament-Manchak theorems. The three extensions show that in almost all classical spacetimes, observers cannot collect sufficient data to determine whether the application conditions for the classic singularity theorems are satisfied or whether their spacetime satisfies the two necessary conditions for a cosmic beginning. Lastly, a reply is offered to the objection that the skeptical consequences of the three extensions can be overcome with induction. Importantly, all past singular dust FLRW spacetimes have observationally indistinguishable counterparts which, while sharing a number of important local properties, either do not include a singularity to the past of every point or else do not have the sort of time ordering intuitively required for a cosmic beginning.
2603.04159
Mar 2026History and Philosophy of Physics
The informational observer in Relational Quantum Mechanics
Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) treats quantum states as observer-dependent facts rather than absolute properties. While this relational stance is conceptually attractive, it raises concerns about empirical confirmation, particularly in multi-observer scenarios. Existing responses within RQM focus on securing agreement between observers by strengthening the status, stability, or accessibility of recorded outcomes. However, they leave open a more basic question: what grounds the persistence of an observer across time? Scientific observation presupposes stable records and the capacity to relate outcomes across successive measurements. We argue that the minimal definition of the observer in RQM as a merely interacting physical system is insufficient to support this requirement. We propose a complementary account of the observer that distinguishes physical interaction from informational coherence, and show how this distinction supports empirical confirmation in Wigner's friend-type scenarios.
2603.02978
Mar 2026History and Philosophy of Physics
