9,771 papers
Comprehensive List of User Deception Techniques in Emails
Email remains a central communication medium, yet its long-standing design and interface conventions continue to enable deceptive attacks. This research note presents a structured list of 42 email-based deception techniques, documented with 64 concrete example implementations, organized around the sender, link, and attachment security indicators as well as techniques targeting the email rendering environment. Building on a prior systematic literature review, we consolidate previously reported techniques with newly developed example implementations and introduce novel deception techniques identified through our own examination. Rather than assessing effectiveness or real-world severity, each entry explains the underlying mechanism in isolation, separating the high-level deception goal from its concrete technical implementation. The documented techniques serve as modular building blocks and a structured reference for future work on countermeasures across infrastructure, email client design, and security awareness, supporting researchers as well as developers, operators, and designers working in these areas.
2604.04926Apr 2026
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Strengthening Human-Centric Chain-of-Thought Reasoning Integrity in LLMs via a Structured Prompt Framework
Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been used to enhance the reasoning capability of LLMs. However, its reliability in security-sensitive analytical tasks remains insufficiently examined, particularly under structured human evaluation. Alternative approaches, such as model scaling and fine-tuning can be used to help improve performance. These methods are also often costly, computationally intensive, or difficult to audit. In contrast, prompt engineering provides a lightweight, transparent, and controllable mechanism for guiding LLM reasoning. This study proposes a structured prompt engineering framework designed to strengthen CoT reasoning integrity while improving security threat and attack detection reliability in local LLM deployments. The framework includes 16 factors grouped into four core dimensions: (1) Context and Scope Control, (2) Evidence Grounding and Traceability, (3) Reasoning Structure and Cognitive Control, and (4) Security-Specific Analytical Constraints. Rather than optimizing the wording of the prompt heuristically, the framework introduces explicit reasoning controls to mitigate hallucination and prevent reasoning drift, as well as strengthening interpretability in security-sensitive contexts. Using DDoS attack detection in SDN traffic as a case study, multiple model families were evaluated under structured and unstructured prompting conditions. Pareto frontier analysis and ablation experiments demonstrate consistent reasoning improvements (up to 40% in smaller models) and stable accuracy gains across scales. Human evaluation with strong inter-rater agreement (Cohen's k > 0.80) confirms robustness. The results establish structured prompting as an effective and practical approach for reliable and explainable AI-driven cybersecurity analysis.
2604.04852Apr 2026
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2604.04833Cryptanalysis of the Legendre Pseudorandom Function over Extension Fields
The Legendre Pseudorandom Function (PRF) is a highly efficient cryptographic primitive built upon the Legendre symbol, valued for its low multiplicative complexity in Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) protocols. While its security over prime fields $\mathbb{F}_p$ is well-documented, recent interest has shifted toward instantiations over extension fields $\mathbb{F}_{p^r}$. This paper presents the first comprehensive cryptanalysis of the single-degree Legendre PRF operating over $\mathbb{F}_{p^r}$. First, we analyze polynomial input encoding under a standard passive threat model (sequential additive counter queries). We demonstrate that while the absence of polynomial carry-overs causes an asynchronous "no-carry fracture" that neutralizes classical sliding-window collision attacks, the fracture itself is deterministically periodic. By introducing a novel "Differential Signature" bucketing technique, we prove that an adversary can systematically group fractured sequences by their structural shapes to bypass this defense, recovering the secret key in $\mathcal{O}(U \cdot p^r/M)$ operations, where $U$ is the unicity distance. Second, we evaluate the PRF under an active Chosen-Query threat model. We demonstrate that an adversary can circumvent the additive fracture by evaluating the PRF along a geometric sequence generated by a primitive polynomial. This structure invokes strict multiplicative homomorphism over $\mathbb{F}^*_{p^r}$, permitting a direct generalization of state-of-the-art table collision attacks to extract the key in $\mathcal{O}(p^r/M)$ operations. Finally, we establish the cryptographic boundaries of these attacks, formally proving the necessity of higher-degree key variants ($d \ge 2$) to achieve exponential security against structural reduction in extension fields.
2604.04833Apr 2026
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Unpacking .zip: A First Look at Domain and File Name Confusion
The namespace for filenames and DNS names has overlapped since the introduction of DNS in 1985: \texttt{.com} was the original binary format used for DOS and CP/M systems. Recently the introduction of gTLDs such as \texttt{.zip} and \texttt{.mov}, coupled with the growing prevalence of web resources, has ignited new concerns about potential issues related to DNS and filename confusion. Thus far, the discourse on DNS/filename confusion has been piecemeal and hypothetical, making it unclear what, if any, security concerns credibly exist. To address this gap, we provide the first enumeration of how DNS/filename confusion can be abused. We then perform the first empirical case studies of DNS/filename confusion in the wild, which highlights suspected confusion across a wide range of software. Finally, based on our preliminary findings, we provide suggestions and guidance for future research on this topic.
2604.04805Apr 2026
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GPU Acceleration of TFHE-Based High-Precision Nonlinear Layers for Encrypted LLM Inference
Deploying large language models (LLMs) as cloud services raises privacy concerns as inference may leak sensitive data. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows computation on encrypted data, but current FHE methods struggle with efficient and precise nonlinear function evaluation. Specifically, CKKS-based approaches require high-degree polynomial approximations, which are costly when target precision increases. Alternatively, TFHE's Programmable Bootstrapping (PBS) outperforms CKKS by offering exact lookup-table evaluation. But it lacks high-precision implementations of LLM nonlinear layers and underutilizes GPU resources. We propose \emph{TIGER}, the first GPU-accelerated framework for high-precision TFHE-based nonlinear LLM layer evaluation. TIGER offers: (1) GPU-optimized WoP-PBS method combined with numerical algorithms to surpass native lookup-table precision limits on nonlinear functions; (2) high-precision and efficient implementations of key nonlinear layers, enabling practical encrypted inference; (3) batch-driven design exploiting inter-input parallelism to boost GPU efficiency. TIGER achieves 7.17$\times$, 16.68$\times$, and 17.05$\times$ speedups over a CPU baseline for GELU, Softmax, and LayerNorm, respectively.
2604.04783Apr 2026
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Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw
OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.
2604.04759Apr 2026
View2604.04757Undetectable Conversations Between AI Agents via Pseudorandom Noise-Resilient Key Exchange
AI agents are increasingly deployed to interact with other agents on behalf of users and organizations. We ask whether two such agents, operated by different entities, can carry out a parallel secret conversation while still producing a transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from an honest interaction, even to a strong passive auditor that knows the full model descriptions, the protocol, and the agents' private contexts. Building on recent work on watermarking and steganography for LLMs, we first show that if the parties possess an interaction-unique secret key, they can facilitate an optimal-rate covert conversation: the hidden conversation can exploit essentially all of the entropy present in the honest message distributions. Our main contributions concern extending this to the keyless setting, where the agents begin with no shared secret. We show that covert key exchange, and hence covert conversation, is possible even when each model has an arbitrary private context, and their messages are short and fully adaptive, assuming only that sufficiently many individual messages have at least constant min-entropy. This stands in contrast to previous covert communication works, which relied on the min-entropy in each individual message growing with the security parameter. To obtain this, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive, which we call pseudorandom noise-resilient key exchange: a key-exchange protocol whose public transcript is pseudorandom while still remaining correct under constant noise. We study this primitive, giving several constructions relevant to our application as well as strong limitations showing that more naive variants are impossible or vulnerable to efficient attacks. These results show that transcript auditing alone cannot rule out covert coordination between AI agents, and identify a new cryptographic theory that may be of independent interest.
2604.04757Apr 2026
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RegGuard: Legitimacy and Fairness Enforcement for Optimistic Rollups
Optimistic rollups provide scalable smart-contract execution but remain unsuitable for regulated financial applications due to three structural gaps: semantic legitimacy, cross-layer state consistency, and ordering fairness. We introduce RegGuard, a unified framework that enhances optimistic rollups with comprehensive legitimacy guarantees. RegGuard integrates three coordinated mechanisms: a decidable semantic validator powered by the RegSpec rule language for encoding regulatory constraints; a cross-layer state pre-synchronization validator that detects inconsistent L1-L2 dependencies with probabilistic reliability bounds; and a cryptographically verifiable fair-ordering service that ensures transaction sequencing fairness with negligible violation probability. We implement a 15,000-line prototype integrated into an Optimism-based rollup and evaluate it under adversarial conditions. RegGuard reduces settlement failures by over 90%, prevents detectable ordering manipulation, and maintains 85% of baseline throughput.
2604.04748Apr 2026
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Economic Security of VDF-Based Randomness Beacons: Models, Thresholds, and Design Guidelines
Randomness beacons based on Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) are increasingly proposed for blockchains and distributed systems, promising publicly verifiable delay and bias resistance. Existing analyses, however, treat adversaries purely as cryptographic entities and overlook that real attackers are economically motivated. A VDF may be sequentially secure, yet still vulnerable if a rational adversary can profit by purchasing faster hardware and exploiting reward spikes such as MEV opportunities. We develop a formal framework for economic security of VDF-based randomness beacons. Modeling the attacker as a rational agent facing hardware speedup, operating costs, and stochastic rewards, we cast the attack decision as an optimal-stopping problem and prove that optimal behavior has a monotone threshold structure. This yields tight necessary and sufficient conditions relating delay parameters to adversarial cost and reward distributions. We extend the analysis to grinding, selective abort, and multi-adversary competition, demonstrating how each amplifies effective rewards and increases required delays. Using realistic cloud costs, hardware benchmarks, and MEV data, we show that many proposed VDF delays, on the order of a few seconds, are economically insecure under plausible conditions. We conclude with deployable guidelines and introduce Economically Secure Delay Parameters (ESDPs) to support principled parameter selection in practical systems.
2604.04744Apr 2026
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Fine-Tuning Integrity for Modern Neural Networks: Structured Drift Proofs via Norm, Rank, and Sparsity Certificates
Fine-tuning is now the primary method for adapting large neural networks, but it also introduces new integrity risks. An untrusted party can insert backdoors, change safety behavior, or overwrite large parts of a model while claiming only small updates. Existing verification tools focus on inference correctness or full-model provenance and do not address this problem. We introduce Fine-Tuning Integrity (FTI) as a security goal for controlled model evolution. An FTI system certifies that a fine-tuned model differs from a trusted base only within a policy-defined drift class. We propose Succinct Model Difference Proofs (SMDPs) as a new cryptographic primitive for enforcing these drift constraints. SMDPs provide zero-knowledge proofs that the update to a model is norm-bounded, low-rank, or sparse. The verifier cost depends only on the structure of the drift, not on the size of the model. We give concrete SMDP constructions based on random projections, polynomial commitments, and streaming linear checks. We also prove an information-theoretic lower bound showing that some form of structure is necessary for succinct proofs. Finally, we present architecture-aware instantiations for transformers, CNNs, and MLPs, together with an end-to-end system that aggregates block-level proofs into a global certificate.
2604.04738Apr 2026
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Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification
The governance of frontier AI increasingly relies on controlling access to computational resources, yet the hardware-level mechanisms invoked by policy proposals remain largely unexamined from an engineering perspective. This paper bridges the gap between AI governance and computer engineering by proposing a taxonomy of 20 hardware-level governance mechanisms, organised by function (monitoring, verification, enforcement) and assessed for technical feasibility on a four-point scale from currently deployable to speculative. For each mechanism, we provide a technical description, a feasibility rating, and an identification of adversarial vulnerabilities. We map the taxonomy onto four governance scenarios: domestic regulation, bilateral agreements, multilateral treaty verification, and industry self-regulation. Our analysis reveals a structural mismatch: the mechanisms most needed for treaty verification, including on-chip compute metering, cryptographic proof-of-training, and hardware-embedded enforcement, are also the least mature. We assess principal threats to compute-based governance, including algorithmic efficiency gains, distributed training methods, and sovereignty concerns. We identify a temporal constraint: the window during which semiconductor manufacturing concentration makes hardware-level governance implementable is narrowing, while R&D timelines for critical mechanisms span years. We present an adversary-tiered threat analysis distinguishing commercial, non-state, and nation-state actors, arguing the appropriate security standard is tamper-evident assurance analogous to IAEA verification rather than absolute tamper-proofing. The taxonomy, feasibility classification, and mechanism-to-scenario mapping provide a technical foundation for policymakers and identify the R&D investments required before hardware-level governance can support verifiable international agreements.
2604.04712Apr 2026
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Bridging Safety and Security in Complex Systems: A Model-Based Approach with SAFT-GT Toolchain
In the rapidly evolving landscape of software engineering, the demand for robust and secure systems has become increasingly critical. This is especially true for self-adaptive systems due to their complexity and the dynamic environments in which they operate. To address this issue, we designed and developed the SAFT-GT toolchain that tackles the multifaceted challenges associated with ensuring both safety and security. This paper provides a comprehensive description of the toolchain's architecture and functionalities, including the Attack-Fault Trees generation and model combination approaches. We emphasize the toolchain's ability to integrate seamlessly with existing systems, allowing for enhanced safety and security analyses without requiring extensive modifications and domain knowledge. Our proposed approach can address evolving security threats, including both known vulnerabilities and emerging attack vectors that could compromise the system. As a use case for the toolchain, we integrate it into the feedback loop of self-adaptive systems. Finally, to validate the practical applicability of the toolchain, we conducted an extensive user study involving domain experts, whose insights and feedback underscore the toolchain's relevance and usability in real-world scenarios. Our findings demonstrate the toolchain's effectiveness in real-world applications while highlighting areas for future improvements. The toolchain and associated resources are available in an open-source repository to promote reproducibility and encourage further research in this field.
2604.04705Apr 2026
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GPIR: Enabling Practical Private Information Retrieval with GPUs
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows private database queries but is hindered by intense server-side computation and memory traffic. Modern lattice-based PIR protocols typically involve three phases: ExpandQuery (expanding a query into encrypted indices), RowSel (encrypted row selection), and ColTor (recursive "column tournament" for final selection). ExpandQuery and ColTor primarily perform number-theoretic transforms (NTTs), whereas RowSel reduces to large-scale independent matrix-matrix multiplications (GEMMs). GPUs are theoretically ideal for these tasks, provided multi-client batching is used to achieve high throughput. However, batching fundamentally reshapes performance bottlenecks; while it amortizes database access costs, it expands working sets beyond the L2 cache capacity, causing divergent memory behaviors and excessive DRAM traffic. We present GPIR, a GPU-accelerated PIR system that rethinks kernel design, data layout, and execution scheduling. We introduce a stage-aware hybrid execution model that dynamically switches between operation-level kernels, which execute each primitive operation separately, and stage-level kernels, which fuse all operations within a protocol stage into a single kernel to maximize on-chip data reuse. For RowSel, we identify a performance gap caused by a structural mismatch between NTT-driven data layouts and tiled GEMM access patterns, which is exacerbated by multi-client batching. We resolve this through a transposed-layout GEMM design and fine-grained pipelining. Finally, we extend GPIR to multi-GPU systems, scaling both query throughput and database capacity with negligible communication overhead. GPIR achieves up to 305.7x higher throughput than PIRonGPU, the state-of-the-art GPU implementation.
2604.04696Apr 2026
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Packing Entries to Diagonals for Homomorphic Sparse-Matrix Vector Multiplication
Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computation over encrypted data but incurs a substantial overhead. For sparse-matrix vector multiplication, the widely used Halevi and Shoup (2014) scheme has a cost linear in the number of occupied cyclic diagonals, which may be many due to the irregular nonzero pattern of the matrix. In this work, we study how to permute the rows and columns of a sparse matrix so that its nonzeros are packed into as few cyclic diagonals as possible. We formalise this as the two-dimensional diagonal packing problem (2DPP), introduce the two-dimensional circular bandsize metric, and give an integer programming formulation that yields optimal solutions for small instances. For large matrices, we propose practical ordering heuristics that combine graph-based initial orderings - based on bandwidth reduction, anti-bandwidth maximisation, and spectral analysis - and an iterative-improvement-based optimization phase employing 2OPT and 3OPT swaps. We also introduce a dense row/column elimination strategy and an HE-aware cost model that quantifies the benefits of isolating dense structures. Experiments on 175 sparse matrices from the SuiteSparse collection show that our ordering-optimisation variants can reduce the diagonal count by $5.5\times$ on average ($45.6\times$ for one instance). In addition, the dense row/column elimination approach can be useful for cases where the proposed permutation techniques are not sufficient; for instance, in one case, the additional elimination helped to reduce the encrypted multiplication cost by $23.7\times$ whereas without elimination, the improvement was only $1.9\times$.
2604.04683Apr 2026
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Digital Privacy in IoT: Exploring Challenges, Approaches and Open Issues
Privacy has always been a critical issue in the digital era, particularly with the increasing use of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. As the IoT continues to transform industries such as healthcare, smart cities, and home automation, it has also introduced serious challenges regarding the security of sensitive and private data. This paper examines the complex landscape of digital privacy in IoT ecosystems, highlighting the need to protect personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals and uphold their rights to digital independence. Global events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have accelerated the adoption of IoT, raising concerns about privacy and data protection. This paper provides an in-depth examination of digital privacy risks in the IoT domain and introduces a clear taxonomy for evaluating them using the IEEE Digital Privacy Model. The proposed framework categorizes privacy risks into five types: identity-oriented, behavioral, inference, data manipulation, and regulatory risks. We review existing digital privacy solutions, including encryption technologies, blockchain, federated learning, differential privacy, reinforcement learning, AI, and dynamic consent mechanisms, to mitigate these risks. We also highlight how these privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) help with data confidentiality, access control, and trust management. Additionally, this study presents AURA-IoT, a futuristic framework that tackles AI-driven privacy risks through a multi-layered structure. AURA-IoT integrates adversarial robustness, explainability, transparency, fairness, compliance, dynamic consent, and policy enforcement mechanisms to ensure digital privacy, security, and accountable IoT operations. Finally, we discuss ongoing challenges and potential research directions for integrating AI and encryption-based privacy solutions to achieve comprehensive digital privacy in future IoT systems.
2604.04572Apr 2026
View2604.04561Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities
LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.
2604.04561Apr 2026
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Explainable Autonomous Cyber Defense using Adversarial Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Autonomous agents are increasingly deployed in both offensive and defensive cyber operations, creating high-speed, closed-loop interactions in critical infrastructure environments. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors exploit "Living off the Land" techniques and targeted telemetry perturbations to induce ambiguity in monitoring systems, causing automated defenses to overreact or misclassify benign behavior as malicious activity. Existing monolithic and multi-agent defense pipelines largely operate on correlation-based signals, lack structural constraints on response actions, and are vulnerable to reasoning drift under ambiguous or adversarial inputs. We present the Causal Multi-Agent Decision Framework (C-MADF), a structurally constrained architecture for autonomous cyber defense that integrates causal modeling with adversarial dual-policy control. C-MADF first learns a Structural Causal Model (SCM) from historical telemetry and compiles it into an investigation-level Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that defines admissible response transitions. This roadmap is formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) whose action space is explicitly restricted to causally consistent transitions. Decision-making within this constrained space is performed by a dual-agent reinforcement learning system in which a threat-optimizing Blue-Team policy is counterbalanced by a conservatively shaped Red-Team policy. Inter-policy disagreement is quantified through a Policy Divergence Score and exposed via a human-in-the-loop interface equipped with an Explainability-Transparency Score that serves as an escalation signal under uncertainty. On the real-world CICIoT2023 dataset, C-MADF reduces the false-positive rate from 11.2%, 9.7%, and 8.4% in three cutting-edge literature baselines to 1.8%, while achieving 0.997 precision, 0.961 recall, and 0.979 F1-score.
2604.04442Apr 2026
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DAO to (Anonymous) DAO Transactions
Blockchain assets are increasingly controlled by organizations rather than individuals. DAO treasuries, consortium wallets, and custodial exchanges rely on threshold authorization and multi-party key management, yet existing payment mechanisms still target single-user wallets, leaving no unified solution for organizational transfers. We formalize the problem of \emph{DAO-to-(anonymous)-DAO} transactions and present \textsc{Dao$^2$}, a framework that enables one threshold-controlled organization to pay another, optionally with recipient anonymity, while keeping received funds under distributed control. \textsc{Dao$^2$} combines three components: \emph{distributed key derivation} (DKD) for non-stealth child addresses, \emph{distributed stealth-address generation} (DSAG) for unlinkable one-time destinations, and \emph{threshold signatures} for authorization. For ordinary transfers, the receiver derives a non-stealth address via DKD; for anonymous transfers, it derives a stealth address via DSAG. The sender then threshold-signs the payment, and the receiver redeems the funds without reconstructing any master secret. We formally prove its security and evaluate a prototype. A complete anonymous DAO-to-DAO transaction for a typical-sized (e.g., 7-member) DAO finishes in under 27\,ms with less than 1.2\,KB of communication, and scales linearly with DAO size.
2604.04369Apr 2026
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Evaluating Future Air Traffic Management Security
The L-Band Digital Aviation Communication System (LDACS) aims to modernize communications between the aircraft and the tower. Besides digitizing this type of communication, the contributors also focus on protecting them against cyberattacks. There are several proposals regarding LDACS security, and a recent one suggests the use of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for the authentication module. This work demonstrates this PUF-based authentication mechanism along with its potential vulnerabilities. Sophisticated models are able to predict PUFs, and, on the other hand, quantum computers are capable of threatening current cryptography, consisting factors that jeopardize the authentication mechanism giving the ability to perform impersonation attacks. In addition, aging is a characteristic that affects the stability of PUFs, which may cause instability issues, rendering the system unavailable. In this context, this work proposes the well-established Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), as an alternative solution.
2604.04293Apr 2026
View2604.04289Poisoned Identifiers Survive LLM Deobfuscation: A Case Study on Claude Opus 4.6
When an LLM deobfuscates JavaScript, can poisoned identifier names in the string table survive into the model's reconstructed code, even when the model demonstrably understands the correct semantics? Using Claude Opus 4.6 across 192 inference runs on two code archetypes (force-directed graph simulation, A* pathfinding; 50 conditions, N=3-6), we found three consistent patterns: (1) Poisoned names persisted in every baseline run on both artifacts (physics: 8/8; pathfinding: 5/5). Matched controls showed this extends to terms with zero semantic fit when the string table does not form a coherent alternative domain. (2) Persistence coexisted with correct semantic commentary: in 15/17 runs the model wrote wrong variable names while correctly describing the actual operation in comments. (3) Task framing changed persistence: explicit verification prompts had no effect (12/12 across 4 variants), but reframing from "deobfuscate this" to "write a fresh implementation" reduced propagation from 100% to 0-20% on physics and to 0% on pathfinding, while preserving the checked algorithmic structure. Matched-control experiments showed zero-fit terms persist at the same rate when the replacement table lacks a coherent alternative-domain signal. Per-term variation in earlier domain-gradient experiments is confounded with domain-level coherence and recoverability. These observations are from two archetypes on one model family (Opus 4.6 primary; Haiku 4.5 spot-check). Broader generalization is needed
2604.04289Apr 2026
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