Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Stackelberg Game with Insider

Xiaoyu Xin, Gehui Xu, Yiguang Hong

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters perceived by followers to enhance defense performance when followers operate under misperceived and uncertain observation. Specifically, we propose a unified three party leader follower game framework and introduce the concepts of Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE), which generalize classical two-player Stackelberg and deception games. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency between DSE and HNE, ensuring that the defender's utility remains invariant when the hierarchical structure degenerates into a simultaneous-move scenario. Moreover, we propose a scalable hypergradient-based algorithm with established convergence guarantees for seeking DSE, efficiently addressing the computational challenges posed by non-smooth and set-valued best-response mappings. Finally, we apply theoretical analysis to practical scenarios in secure wireless communication and defense against insider-assisted false data injection attacks.

Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Stackelberg Game with Insider

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters perceived by followers to enhance defense performance when followers operate under misperceived and uncertain observation. Specifically, we propose a unified three party leader follower game framework and introduce the concepts of Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE), which generalize classical two-player Stackelberg and deception games. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency between DSE and HNE, ensuring that the defender's utility remains invariant when the hierarchical structure degenerates into a simultaneous-move scenario. Moreover, we propose a scalable hypergradient-based algorithm with established convergence guarantees for seeking DSE, efficiently addressing the computational challenges posed by non-smooth and set-valued best-response mappings. Finally, we apply theoretical analysis to practical scenarios in secure wireless communication and defense against insider-assisted false data injection attacks.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 16 sections, 11 theorems, 78 equations, 12 figures, 1 table, 2 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Contributions
  3. Related work
  4. Three-party Deception Game Model
  5. Notation and Preliminaries
  6. Deception Game Model
  7. Existence and Consistency of Equilibria
  8. Equilibrium existence
  9. Consistency between DSE and HNE
  10. Algorithm design for DSE seeking
  11. Inner Loop
  12. Convergence Analysis of Algorithm 1
  13. Application scenarios
  14. Secure Wireless Communication
  15. Defense against IA-FDI attack in microgrid
  16. ...and 1 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 3.1

Under Assumptions a 2.1-a 2.3, the SDSE set is nonempty. Thus, the DSE set is nonempty. $\blacktriangleleft$$\blacktriangleleft$

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: The leader's utility
  • Figure 2: Robustness Assurance
  • Figure 3: The leader's utility.
  • Figure 4: Wireless communication scenario
  • Figure 5: The Impact of Deception
  • ...and 7 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (16)

  • Definition 2.1
  • Definition 2.2
  • Definition 2.3
  • Definition 2.4
  • Lemma 3.1
  • Lemma 3.2
  • Lemma 3.3
  • Remark 3.1
  • Theorem 3.1
  • Lemma 4.1
  • ...and 6 more