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Neural Reconstruction of LiDAR Point Clouds under Jamming Attacks via Full-Waveform Representation and Simultaneous Laser Sensing

Ryo Yoshida, Takami Sato, Wenlun Zhang, Yuki Hayakawa, Shota Nagai, Takahiro Kado, Taro Beppu, Ibuki Fujioka, Yunshan Zhong, Kentaro Yoshioka

Abstract

LiDAR sensors are critical for autonomous driving perception, yet remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Jamming attacks inject high-frequency laser pulses that completely blind LiDAR sensors by overwhelming authentic returns with malicious signals. We discover that while point clouds become randomized, the underlying full-waveform data retains distinguishable signatures between attack and legitimate signals. In this work, we propose PULSAR-Net, capable of reconstructing authentic point clouds under jamming attacks by leveraging previously underutilized intermediate full-waveform representations and simultaneous laser sensing in modern LiDAR systems. PULSAR-Net adopts a novel U-Net architecture with axial spatial attention mechanisms specifically designed to identify attack-induced signals from authentic object returns in the full-waveform representation. To address the lack of full-waveform representations in existing LiDAR datasets under jamming attacks, we introduce a physics-aware dataset generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic full-waveform representations under jamming attacks. Despite being trained exclusively on synthetic data, PULSAR-Net achieves reconstruction rates of 92% and 73% for vehicles obscured by jamming attacks in real-world static and driving scenarios, respectively.

Neural Reconstruction of LiDAR Point Clouds under Jamming Attacks via Full-Waveform Representation and Simultaneous Laser Sensing

Abstract

LiDAR sensors are critical for autonomous driving perception, yet remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Jamming attacks inject high-frequency laser pulses that completely blind LiDAR sensors by overwhelming authentic returns with malicious signals. We discover that while point clouds become randomized, the underlying full-waveform data retains distinguishable signatures between attack and legitimate signals. In this work, we propose PULSAR-Net, capable of reconstructing authentic point clouds under jamming attacks by leveraging previously underutilized intermediate full-waveform representations and simultaneous laser sensing in modern LiDAR systems. PULSAR-Net adopts a novel U-Net architecture with axial spatial attention mechanisms specifically designed to identify attack-induced signals from authentic object returns in the full-waveform representation. To address the lack of full-waveform representations in existing LiDAR datasets under jamming attacks, we introduce a physics-aware dataset generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic full-waveform representations under jamming attacks. Despite being trained exclusively on synthetic data, PULSAR-Net achieves reconstruction rates of 92% and 73% for vehicles obscured by jamming attacks in real-world static and driving scenarios, respectively.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 28 sections, 5 figures, 11 tables.

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: Reconstruction demo of our PULSAR-Net from LiDAR sensing under a jamming attack. Our PULSAR-Net can effectively recover the point cloud (d), which is faithful to the original one (b), by leveraging the intermediate full-waveform representation and simultaneous sensing feature available in modern LiDARs.
  • Figure 2: Conceptual illustration of a LiDAR jamming attack and simultaneous sensing.
  • Figure 3: Overview of PULSAR-Net, a U-Net-inspired architecture using depthwise-separable 3D convolutions for efficient, lightweight feature extraction. It incorporates axial attention to model both spatial and temporal dependencies within full-waveforms.
  • Figure 4: Overview of the real-world experiment and its results: (i) experimental setup of a jamming attack on our LiDAR developed with a major LiDAR supplier to stream full waveform, (ii) benign, attack-compromised, and reconstructed point clouds in a static scenario with a reference vision, and (iii-iv) 3 frames of camera frames and point clouds of benign, attack-compromised, and reconstructed point clouds in driving scenarios
  • Figure 5: Point cloud denoising methods fail under jamming attacks. Red points indicate valid structures (neighbors within 5cm), and gray points indicate isolated points.