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Agentic Markets: Equilibrium Effects of Improving Consumer Search

Brendan Lucier, Nicole Immorlica, Markus Mobius, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Daniel G. Goldstein, Jake M. Hofman, Sonia Jaffe, David M. Rothschild

Abstract

Motivated by agentic markets -- two-sided markets in which consumers and businesses are assisted by AI tools that facilitate consumers' search -- we study the impact of improved search technology on learning and welfare in markets. We put forth a model where consumers engage in costly search to acquire signals of product fit prior to purchase. The market tracks indications of fit for searched products and indications of quality for chosen products, thereby guiding searches. We characterize the long-run steady-state of the resulting dynamics as well as the impact of improving search technology. We find cheaper search improves learning and consumer surplus, whereas more informative search can degrade both unless the market learns as much as consumers about the products by, for example, ``reading the transcripts'' of agentic conversations. Finally, we consider the impact of search improvements on how businesses set prices. At equilibrium prices in symmetric markets, consumer surplus is improved by cheaper search but may be decreased by more informative search, due to weakened inter-business competition.

Agentic Markets: Equilibrium Effects of Improving Consumer Search

Abstract

Motivated by agentic markets -- two-sided markets in which consumers and businesses are assisted by AI tools that facilitate consumers' search -- we study the impact of improved search technology on learning and welfare in markets. We put forth a model where consumers engage in costly search to acquire signals of product fit prior to purchase. The market tracks indications of fit for searched products and indications of quality for chosen products, thereby guiding searches. We characterize the long-run steady-state of the resulting dynamics as well as the impact of improving search technology. We find cheaper search improves learning and consumer surplus, whereas more informative search can degrade both unless the market learns as much as consumers about the products by, for example, ``reading the transcripts'' of agentic conversations. Finally, we consider the impact of search improvements on how businesses set prices. At equilibrium prices in symmetric markets, consumer surplus is improved by cheaper search but may be decreased by more informative search, due to weakened inter-business competition.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 40 sections, 18 theorems, 31 equations, 1 figure, 1 algorithm.

Key Result

Proposition 4.1

Algorithm alg:index maximizes $\operatornamewithlimits{\mathbb{E}}[U_i]$, expected consumer utility, over all search policies.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: A visualization of the proof of Theorem \ref{['thm:cheaper.search.pricing']}. Left: the monopolist quantile revenue curves for markets $\mathcal{M}$ (green) and $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}$ (orange). The ratio $\tilde{R}^*/\tilde{R}(q)$ is at most $R^*/R(q)$. Right: equilibrium price CDFs for markets $\mathcal{M}$ (green) and $\widetilde{\mathcal{M}}$ (orange). Purple is an additive shift of $G(p)$ by $\lambda$. Equilibrium conditions imply that the orange curve lies to the left of purple, so $\tilde{G}(p+\lambda) \geq G(p)$, which implies average prices rise by at most $\lambda$.

Theorems & Definitions (51)

  • Remark 3.1
  • Definition 3.2
  • Remark 3.3
  • Remark 3.4: Independence
  • Definition 3.5
  • Proposition 4.1
  • proof
  • Proposition 5.1
  • Definition 5.2
  • Lemma 5.3
  • ...and 41 more