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An Approach to Generate Attack Graphs with a Case Study on Siemens PCS7 Blueprint for Water Treatment Plants

Lucas Miranda, Carlos Banjar, Daniel Menasche, Anton Kocheturov, Gaurav Srivastava, Tobias Limmer

Abstract

Assessing the security posture of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is critical for protecting essential infrastructure. However, the complexity and scale of these environments make it challenging to identify and prioritize potential attack paths. This paper introduces a semi-automated approach for generating attack graphs in ICS environments to visualize and analyze multi-step attack scenarios. Our methodology integrates network topology information with vulnerability data to construct a model of the system. This model is then processed by a stateful traversal algorithm to identify potential exploit chains based on preconditions and consequences. We present a case study applying the proposed framework to the Siemens PCS7 Cybersecurity Blueprint for Water Treatment Plants. The results demonstrate the framework's ability to simulate different attack scenarios, including those originating from known CVEs and potential device misconfigurations. We show how a single point of failure can compromise network segmentation and how patching a critical vulnerability can protect an entire security zone, providing actionable insights for risk mitigation.

An Approach to Generate Attack Graphs with a Case Study on Siemens PCS7 Blueprint for Water Treatment Plants

Abstract

Assessing the security posture of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is critical for protecting essential infrastructure. However, the complexity and scale of these environments make it challenging to identify and prioritize potential attack paths. This paper introduces a semi-automated approach for generating attack graphs in ICS environments to visualize and analyze multi-step attack scenarios. Our methodology integrates network topology information with vulnerability data to construct a model of the system. This model is then processed by a stateful traversal algorithm to identify potential exploit chains based on preconditions and consequences. We present a case study applying the proposed framework to the Siemens PCS7 Cybersecurity Blueprint for Water Treatment Plants. The results demonstrate the framework's ability to simulate different attack scenarios, including those originating from known CVEs and potential device misconfigurations. We show how a single point of failure can compromise network segmentation and how patching a critical vulnerability can protect an entire security zone, providing actionable insights for risk mitigation.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 8 sections, 1 equation, 4 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Methodology
  3. Topology Parser and Vulnerability Manager
  4. Attack Graph Generator
  5. Case Study: Siemens PCS7 Blueprint
  6. Likelihood Estimation of Exploitation
  7. Discussion and Related Work
  8. Conclusion and Future Work

Figures (4)

  • Figure 1: Workflow: inputs $\rightarrow$ processing $\rightarrow$ attack graph.
  • Figure 2: Attack graph fragment with exploit paths and one local escalation
  • Figure 3: All possible attack paths leading to the Energy Manager Pro device. Of the 13 paths shown, 12 require only one exploitation step.
  • Figure 4: All possible attack paths leading to the TIM 1531 IRC. Of the 15 paths shown, nine consist of two CVEs, four consist of three CVEs, and two consist of a single CVE.