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Space Fabric: A Satellite-Enhanced Trusted Execution Architecture

Filip Rezabek, Dahlia Malkhi, Amir Yahalom

Abstract

The emergence of decentralized satellite networks creates a pressing need for trust architectures that operate without physical access to hardware, without pre-provisioned vendor secrets, and without dependence on a single manufacturer's attestation service. Terrestrial TEEs are insufficient: hardware-based designs are susceptible to physical attacks, and most platforms root their attestation chains in secrets provisioned during manufacturing, creating a pre-launch trust window and single-vendor dependency that cannot be independently audited. We present Space Fabric, an architecture that provides the missing trust foundation for orbital computing by relocating the trusted computing stack to satellite infrastructure, exploiting post-launch physical inaccessibility as a tamper barrier unattainable by terrestrial deployments. Our Satellite Execution Assurance Protocol binds workload execution to a specific satellite via a Byzantine-tolerant endorsement quorum of distributed ground stations, certifying not only \emph{what} executes inside the TEE but also \emph{where}. All cryptographic secrets are generated within co-located secure elements after launch, with no signing keys accessible on Earth at any point. To reduce single-vendor dependence, Space Fabric distributes its trust anchor across two independent secure elements, an NXP SE050 and a TROPIC01, both of which must co-sign attestation evidence. We implement Space Fabric on a USB Armory Mk II with ARM TrustZone, verify attestation end-to-end using Veraison, and provide a security analysis with satisfaction arguments and impossibility bounds under a strong adaptive adversary.

Space Fabric: A Satellite-Enhanced Trusted Execution Architecture

Abstract

The emergence of decentralized satellite networks creates a pressing need for trust architectures that operate without physical access to hardware, without pre-provisioned vendor secrets, and without dependence on a single manufacturer's attestation service. Terrestrial TEEs are insufficient: hardware-based designs are susceptible to physical attacks, and most platforms root their attestation chains in secrets provisioned during manufacturing, creating a pre-launch trust window and single-vendor dependency that cannot be independently audited. We present Space Fabric, an architecture that provides the missing trust foundation for orbital computing by relocating the trusted computing stack to satellite infrastructure, exploiting post-launch physical inaccessibility as a tamper barrier unattainable by terrestrial deployments. Our Satellite Execution Assurance Protocol binds workload execution to a specific satellite via a Byzantine-tolerant endorsement quorum of distributed ground stations, certifying not only \emph{what} executes inside the TEE but also \emph{where}. All cryptographic secrets are generated within co-located secure elements after launch, with no signing keys accessible on Earth at any point. To reduce single-vendor dependence, Space Fabric distributes its trust anchor across two independent secure elements, an NXP SE050 and a TROPIC01, both of which must co-sign attestation evidence. We implement Space Fabric on a USB Armory Mk II with ARM TrustZone, verify attestation end-to-end using Veraison, and provide a security analysis with satisfaction arguments and impossibility bounds under a strong adaptive adversary.
Paper Structure (110 sections, 3 equations, 10 figures, 7 tables, 2 algorithms)

This paper contains 110 sections, 3 equations, 10 figures, 7 tables, 2 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Background
  3. Trusted Execution Environments
  4. Process-Based TEEs
  5. Intel SGX
  6. ARM TrustZone
  7. VM-Based TEE Solutions
  8. AMD -
  9. Intel TDX
  10. ARM
  11. Software-Level Vulnerabilities
  12. Hardware-Level Vulnerabilities
  13. Trusted Platform Modules
  14. HSM
  15. Satellite Computing
  16. ...and 95 more sections

Figures (10)

  • Figure 1: Simplified architecture of a satellite. Contains external communication, which then forwards local signals to the communication modem. The modem is then connected via Ethernet to the hardware payload, e.g., Space Fabric. The payload can include several external peripherals, such as storage devices.
  • Figure 2: Simplified architecture of an ARM . ensure separation of individual access layers.
  • Figure 3: Overview of parties in the threat model. Each party's color is used in subsequent figures as a line color. Depending on the scenarios, some parties may overlap in their roles.
  • Figure 4: General overview of the Space Fabric Architecture including the components, and trusted components (in orange) of and .
  • Figure 5: Overview of for ARM following OP-TEE approach suzaki2024opteera. The overall goal is to provide a flow for assessing the and ensure freshness to the request.
  • ...and 5 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (4)

  • Definition 1: Satellite Availability
  • Definition 2: Correctness
  • Definition 3: Committee Availability
  • Definition 4: Resistance to Posterior Corruptions