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Non-Exclusive Notifications for Ride-Hailing at Lyft II: Simulations and Marketplace Analysis

Farbod Ekbatani, Rad Niazadeh, Mehdi Golari, Romain Camilleri, Titouan Jehl, Chris Sholley, Matthew Leventi, Theresa Calderon, Angela Lam, Paul Havard Duclos, Tim Holland, James Koch, Shreya Reddy

Abstract

Ride-hailing platforms increasingly face uncertain driver acceptance, which makes traditional one-to-one 'exclusive dispatch (ED)' less efficient: rejections and timeouts force sequential retries and lengthen rider wait times, which in turn creates friction in the marketplace. 'Non-exclusive dispatch (NED)' mitigates this friction by broadcasting a request to multiple drivers in parallel. While NED can reduce latency, it introduces new design challenges -- most notably, how to choose notification sets and how to resolve driver contention (when multiple drivers accept the same ride). In this paper -- the second in a two-part collaboration with Lyft -- we develop a theoretically grounded framework to evaluate the long-run performance and marketplace effects of transitioning from ED to NED. We bridge theory and practice by combining (i) an optimization model that formulates NED as a constrained welfare maximization problem with (ii) large-scale discrete-event simulations on proprietary Lyft traces and (iii) a stylized macroscopic equilibrium model. Across simulation and equilibrium analysis, we find that NED improves key fulfillment metrics relative to ED: it reduces match time (and hence rider reneging) while increasing both the number and the average quality of completed matches. We also quantify the speed--quality trade-off between two common contention resolution rules, 'First-Accept' and 'Best-Accept': First-Accept maximizes speed and throughput, whereas Best-Accept is required to maximize per-match quality. Finally, we show that slightly conservative notification heuristics can improve long-run efficiency by avoiding excessive locking of high-value drivers and preserving future availability.

Non-Exclusive Notifications for Ride-Hailing at Lyft II: Simulations and Marketplace Analysis

Abstract

Ride-hailing platforms increasingly face uncertain driver acceptance, which makes traditional one-to-one 'exclusive dispatch (ED)' less efficient: rejections and timeouts force sequential retries and lengthen rider wait times, which in turn creates friction in the marketplace. 'Non-exclusive dispatch (NED)' mitigates this friction by broadcasting a request to multiple drivers in parallel. While NED can reduce latency, it introduces new design challenges -- most notably, how to choose notification sets and how to resolve driver contention (when multiple drivers accept the same ride). In this paper -- the second in a two-part collaboration with Lyft -- we develop a theoretically grounded framework to evaluate the long-run performance and marketplace effects of transitioning from ED to NED. We bridge theory and practice by combining (i) an optimization model that formulates NED as a constrained welfare maximization problem with (ii) large-scale discrete-event simulations on proprietary Lyft traces and (iii) a stylized macroscopic equilibrium model. Across simulation and equilibrium analysis, we find that NED improves key fulfillment metrics relative to ED: it reduces match time (and hence rider reneging) while increasing both the number and the average quality of completed matches. We also quantify the speed--quality trade-off between two common contention resolution rules, 'First-Accept' and 'Best-Accept': First-Accept maximizes speed and throughput, whereas Best-Accept is required to maximize per-match quality. Finally, we show that slightly conservative notification heuristics can improve long-run efficiency by avoiding excessive locking of high-value drivers and preserving future availability.
Paper Structure (31 sections, 4 theorems, 28 equations, 16 figures, 3 algorithms)

This paper contains 31 sections, 4 theorems, 28 equations, 16 figures, 3 algorithms.

Key Result

Proposition 4.1

The long-run equilibrium market sizes under FA is given by:

Figures (16)

  • Figure 1: Flowchart illustrating the simulation lifecycle from a rider's perspective. (Note: Under BA if the highest-ranked driver accepts prior to the 7th cycle, the match is finalized immediately.)
  • Figure 2: ED vs NED with optimal packing ($\boldsymbol{U=3, \theta=0}$) under FA/BA; The panels report the histogram of average match score, average rider match time, and total number of finalized matches across sampled instances.
  • Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of the proposed algorithms. The red markers ($\boldsymbol{U=1}$) correspond to the exclusive-dispatch baseline and serve as a common starting point for FA (blue) and BA (green) strategies. Notably, the ED+ and the rejection-aware heuristic exhibit minimal variance with respect to $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ and $\boldsymbol{U}$, because ED+ is limited to notifying at most two drivers per request and the heuristic rarely selects more than two drivers.
  • Figure 4: Performance landscape of our algorithms in Appendix \ref{['sec:Algs']} across different configurations. Left: average score vs. average match time. Right: total match count vs. average match time. Each point corresponds to a unique combination of packing algorithm (marker), contention rule (FA vs. BA), $\boldsymbol{U\in\{2,3,4,5\}}$, and $\boldsymbol{\theta\in\{0,\dots,0.5\}}$. The exclusive-dispatch baseline ($\boldsymbol{U=1}$) is highlighted in red.
  • Figure 5: Performance metrics (average score, average match time, match count) for the optimal algorithm, i.e., NED OPT, under $k$-accept strategies with $\boldsymbol{U=5,\theta=0}$, for $\boldsymbol{k\in\{1,2,\ldots,5\}}$.
  • ...and 11 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (5)

  • Proposition 4.1: FA Equilibrium
  • Example 4.1
  • Proposition 4.2: BA Equilibrium
  • Theorem 4.3
  • Proposition 4.4