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Barriers to Gender Convergence: The Interactive Effects of Job Inflexibility and Social Norms

Kazuharu Yanagimoto

Abstract

This paper investigates the barriers to gender convergence using Japan as a salient environment to explore the interactive effects of labor market structures and social norms. I develop a quantitative model of household labor supply where couples jointly decide their occupations and working hours. The model features a labor market with inflexible "regular" jobs with convex pay schedules and flexible "non-regular" jobs, interacting with social norms regarding spousal earnings. The calibrated model successfully reproduces observed gender gaps in participation, occupation, and working hours, and explains 48% of the gender wage gap. The model also accounts for cross-regional differences in gender gaps solely through variation in social norms. Counterfactual simulations show that while increasing job flexibility substantially reduces wage and occupational gaps, the working hours gap persists due to the unequal burden of domestic work. Closing this remaining gap requires policies such as affordable household services. Furthermore, the model suggests that the effects of structural reforms can depend on the strength of gender norms, with larger reductions in gender gaps in more conservative environments.

Barriers to Gender Convergence: The Interactive Effects of Job Inflexibility and Social Norms

Abstract

This paper investigates the barriers to gender convergence using Japan as a salient environment to explore the interactive effects of labor market structures and social norms. I develop a quantitative model of household labor supply where couples jointly decide their occupations and working hours. The model features a labor market with inflexible "regular" jobs with convex pay schedules and flexible "non-regular" jobs, interacting with social norms regarding spousal earnings. The calibrated model successfully reproduces observed gender gaps in participation, occupation, and working hours, and explains 48% of the gender wage gap. The model also accounts for cross-regional differences in gender gaps solely through variation in social norms. Counterfactual simulations show that while increasing job flexibility substantially reduces wage and occupational gaps, the working hours gap persists due to the unequal burden of domestic work. Closing this remaining gap requires policies such as affordable household services. Furthermore, the model suggests that the effects of structural reforms can depend on the strength of gender norms, with larger reductions in gender gaps in more conservative environments.
Paper Structure (32 sections, 22 equations, 18 figures, 7 tables)

This paper contains 32 sections, 22 equations, 18 figures, 7 tables.

Figures (18)

  • Figure 1: Labor Market in Japan. (a) Gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees relative to male earnings. (b) Share of part-time employment in total employment. Part-time employment is defined as usually working less than 30 hours per week in the main job. (c) Employment rate, calculated as the ratio of employed persons to the working-age population. (d) Tertiary education attainment rates in Japan. Sample restricted to ages 25-54. Source from OECD for (a)-(c) and Barro and Lee ( ref-barro2013) for (d).
  • Figure 2: Distribution of Weekly Working Hours and Hourly Wage. The data is pooled from JPSED 2017-2020. The sample includes married men and women aged 25-59.
  • Figure 3: Occupational Choice of Married Individuals. The data is pooled from JPSED 2017-2020. The sample includes married men and women aged 25-59.
  • Figure 4: Flexibility of Regular and Non-regular Jobs. Pooled data from JPSED 2017-2020. The sample includes married men and women aged 25-59. The figure plots the mean score of job flexibility (1: Inflexible to 5: Flexible) regarding working days, hours, and place.
  • Figure 5: Reasons Why Women Choose Non-regular Work. The data is pooled from JPSED 2017-2020. The sample includes married women aged 25-59 who have non-regular jobs. Respondents could select multiple reasons.
  • ...and 13 more figures