Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default

Parikshit De, Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik

Abstract

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.

Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default

Abstract

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.
Paper Structure (8 sections, 32 equations)

This paper contains 8 sections, 32 equations.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Model
  3. Main Results
  4. Failure of Efficiency and Top-Onlyness under Weaker Incentive Constraints
  5. Conclusion
  6. Appendix
  7. Proof of Proposition \ref{['prop']}
  8. Proof of Theorem \ref{['thm']}