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Mitigating Renewable-Induced Risks for Green and Conventional Ammonia Producers through Coordinated Production and Futures Trading

Huayan Geng, Yangjun Zeng, Yiwei Qiu

Abstract

Renewable power-to-ammonia (ReP2A), which uses hydrogen produced from renewable electricity as feedstock, is a promising pathway for decarbonizing the energy, transportation, and chemical sectors. However, variability in renewable generation causes fluctuations in hydrogen supply and ammonia production, leading to revenue instability for both ReP2A producers and conventional fossil-based gray ammonia (GA) producers in the market. Existing studies mainly rely on engineering measures, such as production scheduling, to manage this risk, but their effectiveness is constrained by physical system limits. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a financial instrument termed \emph{renewable ammonia futures} and integrates it with production decisions to hedge ammonia output risk. Production and trading models are developed for both ReP2A and GA producers, with conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) used to represent risk preferences under uncertainty. A game-theoretic framework is established in which the two producers interact in coupled ammonia spot and futures markets, and a Nash bargaining mechanism coordinates their production and trading strategies. Case studies based on a real-world system show that introducing renewable ammonia futures increases the CVaR utilities of ReP2A and GA producers by 5.103% and 10.14%, respectively, improving profit stability under renewable uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis further confirms the effectiveness of the mechanism under different levels of renewable variability and capacity configurations.

Mitigating Renewable-Induced Risks for Green and Conventional Ammonia Producers through Coordinated Production and Futures Trading

Abstract

Renewable power-to-ammonia (ReP2A), which uses hydrogen produced from renewable electricity as feedstock, is a promising pathway for decarbonizing the energy, transportation, and chemical sectors. However, variability in renewable generation causes fluctuations in hydrogen supply and ammonia production, leading to revenue instability for both ReP2A producers and conventional fossil-based gray ammonia (GA) producers in the market. Existing studies mainly rely on engineering measures, such as production scheduling, to manage this risk, but their effectiveness is constrained by physical system limits. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a financial instrument termed \emph{renewable ammonia futures} and integrates it with production decisions to hedge ammonia output risk. Production and trading models are developed for both ReP2A and GA producers, with conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) used to represent risk preferences under uncertainty. A game-theoretic framework is established in which the two producers interact in coupled ammonia spot and futures markets, and a Nash bargaining mechanism coordinates their production and trading strategies. Case studies based on a real-world system show that introducing renewable ammonia futures increases the CVaR utilities of ReP2A and GA producers by 5.103% and 10.14%, respectively, improving profit stability under renewable uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis further confirms the effectiveness of the mechanism under different levels of renewable variability and capacity configurations.
Paper Structure (29 sections, 16 equations, 12 figures, 2 tables)

This paper contains 29 sections, 16 equations, 12 figures, 2 tables.

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: Illustration of ReP2A and GA systems and their interactions with ammonia futures and spot markets.
  • Figure 2: Structure of the interaction models for ReP2A and GA in (a) the ammonia spot market only (Section \ref{['sec:cournot']}) and (b) the futures-spot dual market (Section \ref{['sec:bargining']}).
  • Figure 3: Scenario set of monthly average wind power output used in the base case.
  • Figure 4: (a) Convergence of ammonia price solving Nash-Cournot equilibrium under the spot-only market. (b) Convergence process of the futures-spot joint market equilibrium.
  • Figure 5: Operational results of under spot market only (a) ReP2A production; (b) GA production; (c) ammonia spot market price; and after introducing the futures mechanism (d) ReP2A production; (e) GA production; (f) ammonia spot market price, across 100 scenarios.
  • ...and 7 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (4)

  • Remark 1
  • Remark 2
  • Remark 3
  • Remark 4