Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

A Quantitative Model of Non-Marriage and Fertility: Bargaining over Leisure

Kazuharu Yanagimoto

Abstract

This paper introduces a new factor contributing to the decline in marriage and fertility: the growth of leisure technology. Over recent decades, high-income countries have experienced two notable shifts in household and family dynamics. First, there has been a significant decline in marriage rates and fertility. Second, time has increasingly been allocated to leisure activities. This paper presents a unified model of marriage and fertility, incorporating intra-household bargaining dynamics. The model, calibrated using data from Japan between 2019 and 2023, is employed to assess the impact of leisure technology growth on marriage and fertility during 2005-2009. The findings highlight that leisure technology growth makes single life relatively more appealing compared to marriage and parenthood. The model explains 21.1% of the decline in marriage and 73.1% of the decrease in fertility.

A Quantitative Model of Non-Marriage and Fertility: Bargaining over Leisure

Abstract

This paper introduces a new factor contributing to the decline in marriage and fertility: the growth of leisure technology. Over recent decades, high-income countries have experienced two notable shifts in household and family dynamics. First, there has been a significant decline in marriage rates and fertility. Second, time has increasingly been allocated to leisure activities. This paper presents a unified model of marriage and fertility, incorporating intra-household bargaining dynamics. The model, calibrated using data from Japan between 2019 and 2023, is employed to assess the impact of leisure technology growth on marriage and fertility during 2005-2009. The findings highlight that leisure technology growth makes single life relatively more appealing compared to marriage and parenthood. The model explains 21.1% of the decline in marriage and 73.1% of the decrease in fertility.
Paper Structure (32 sections, 3 theorems, 29 equations, 12 figures, 7 tables)

This paper contains 32 sections, 3 theorems, 29 equations, 12 figures, 7 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Facts
  3. Marriage and Fertility Trends
  4. Why People Do Not Marry
  5. Data and Samples
  6. Child Penalty on Leisure
  7. Intra-Household Time Allocation and Bargaining Power
  8. Model
  9. Setup
  10. Singles
  11. Couples
  12. Equilibrium
  13. Calibration
  14. Exogenous Parameters
  15. Endogenous Parameters
  16. ...and 17 more sections

Key Result

Proposition A.1

In the equation Eq. eq-dist-single, the mass of new arrivals is given by the following formula:

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: Marriage and Fertility in the Past Decades in Japan. Panel (a) shows the fertility rate of women at age 45. The data is from the Human Fertility Database. Panel (b) shows the share of those who have never married at age 45-54. The data is from the Japanese Censuses.
  • Figure 2: Top 5 Reasons Why Do not Get Married. The share of the top 5 reasons why do not get married. The data is from the National Fertility Survey, and the sample is restricted to the age group 25-34 in 2021.
  • Figure 3: Event Study of Time Allocation by Childbirth. The child penalty on leisure for singles and married couples. The data is from the JHPS, and the sample is restricted to the age group 25-54 in 2005-2023.
  • Figure 4: Intra-Household Leisure Time Allocation. A bin-scatter plot of the intra-household leisure time allocation for dual-working married couples. The data is from the JHPS, and the sample is restricted to the age group 25-54 from 2005 to 2023.
  • Figure 5: Marriage Rate by Earnings Decile. The bars show the share of married individuals in each decile of earnings in the baseline model. The points show the marriage rate estimated from the Employment Status Survey 2022.
  • ...and 7 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (7)

  • Definition 3.1: Stationary Matching Equilibrium
  • Proposition A.1: Mass of the New Arrivals
  • proof
  • Proposition A.2: Positive Correlation in Intra-Household Gaps in Wages and Leisure
  • proof
  • Proposition A.3: Calibration of Domestic Labor Productivity
  • proof