Table of Contents
Fetching ...

Unclonable Encryption in the Haar Random Oracle Model

James Bartusek, Eli Goldin

Abstract

We construct unclonable encryption (UE) in the Haar random oracle model, where all parties have query access to $U,U^\dagger,U^*,U^T$ for a Haar random unitary $U$. Our scheme satisfies the standard notion of unclonable indistinguishability security, supports reuse of the secret key, and can encrypt arbitrary-length messages. That is, we give the first evidence that (reusable) UE, which requires computational assumptions, exists in "micocrypt", a world where one-way functions may not exist. As one of our central technical contributions, we build on the recently introduced path recording framework to prove a natural ``unitary reprogramming lemma'', which may be of independent interest.

Unclonable Encryption in the Haar Random Oracle Model

Abstract

We construct unclonable encryption (UE) in the Haar random oracle model, where all parties have query access to for a Haar random unitary . Our scheme satisfies the standard notion of unclonable indistinguishability security, supports reuse of the secret key, and can encrypt arbitrary-length messages. That is, we give the first evidence that (reusable) UE, which requires computational assumptions, exists in "micocrypt", a world where one-way functions may not exist. As one of our central technical contributions, we build on the recently introduced path recording framework to prove a natural ``unitary reprogramming lemma'', which may be of independent interest.
Paper Structure (24 sections, 46 theorems, 145 equations, 21 figures)

This paper contains 24 sections, 46 theorems, 145 equations, 21 figures.

Key Result

Theorem 1.1

For any polynomial message size, there exists a reusable unclonable encryption scheme with unclonable indistinguishability in the Haar random oracle model.

Figures (21)

  • Figure : Hybrid $1$: The security game for uncloneable encryption
  • Figure : Hybrid $3$: We split the Haar random unitary $U$ into two random unitaries: $U_1$ acting on a superset of the encryption randomness and $U_2$ acting on the orthogonal space.
  • Figure : Hybrid $5$: We sample $V$, and then set $U_1$ to first apply $\widetilde{E}_k^{\vec{V}}$.
  • Figure : Hybrid $0$: The game $FindSEnc(C)$.
  • Figure : Hybrid $2$: Instead of sampling $U_1 \gets Haar(S_2)$, we sample each $\ket{\phi_s} = U_1 \ket{s}$ from $HaarSt(S_2)$.
  • ...and 16 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (98)

  • Theorem 1.1: Informal
  • Corollary 1.2
  • Theorem 1.3: Informal
  • Lemma 1.4: Informal: Unitary reprogramming lemma
  • Definition 2.1
  • Definition 2.2
  • Definition 2.3
  • Definition 2.4
  • Definition 2.5: Diamond norm
  • Theorem 2.6
  • ...and 88 more