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Whataboutism

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler

Abstract

We propose a model of whataboutism -- a rhetorical strategy that deflects criticism by citing similar misconduct that goes uncriticized on the critic's side -- and study its implications for social norms governing offensive speech. In an infinite-horizon psychological game with two rival camps, agents weigh the intrinsic benefit of offensive speech against the risk of condemnation. External criticism can be deflected via an equilibrium-based whataboutism rebuttal. We characterize the unique dynamically stable Psychological Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and show that the availability of whataboutism exacerbates offensive speech, to the extent that civility norms can break down entirely, especially in polarized societies.

Whataboutism

Abstract

We propose a model of whataboutism -- a rhetorical strategy that deflects criticism by citing similar misconduct that goes uncriticized on the critic's side -- and study its implications for social norms governing offensive speech. In an infinite-horizon psychological game with two rival camps, agents weigh the intrinsic benefit of offensive speech against the risk of condemnation. External criticism can be deflected via an equilibrium-based whataboutism rebuttal. We characterize the unique dynamically stable Psychological Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and show that the availability of whataboutism exacerbates offensive speech, to the extent that civility norms can break down entirely, especially in polarized societies.
Paper Structure (7 sections, 6 theorems, 24 equations)

This paper contains 7 sections, 6 theorems, 24 equations.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. A Model
  3. A Benchmark
  4. Analysis: Whataboutism
  5. The Main Result
  6. The Frequency of Offensive Speech and Whataboutism
  7. Conclusion

Key Result

Proposition 1

There is a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the benchmark model. In each state $s$, each camp-$I(s)$ agent plays $a=1$ if and only if his intrinsic payoff $v$ is above the cutoff

Theorems & Definitions (10)

  • Proposition 1
  • Definition 1
  • Proposition 2
  • Lemma 3
  • Lemma 4
  • Corollary 5
  • Definition 2
  • Proposition 6
  • Remark 1
  • Remark 2