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ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC - Lightweight Mempool Propagation Without On-Path Proofs

Jian Sheng Wang

TL;DR

AR-ACE is presented, in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation.

Abstract

In post-quantum blockchain settings, objects that require validity proofs (e.g., blob roots, execution-layer or consensus-layer signature aggregates) must be broadcast through mempool and relay networks. Recursive STARKs have been proposed to aggregate such proofs so that each node forwards one proof per tick plus objects without proofs, capping per-node proof bandwidth at roughly 128 KB degree per tick. We observe that propagation does not inherently require validity proofs on the path-only a lightweight assurance that an object is eligible for relay. We present AR-ACE (ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC), in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations (e.g., identity-bound signatures or commitments) and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof. Only the builder (or final verifier) performs a single aggregated validity proof over the set of objects it includes. This proof-off-path design removes proof overhead from the propagation path entirely, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation. When instantiated with ACE-GF-derived attestation keys, AR-ACE preserves a unified identity story with on-chain authorization and is PQC-ready. We specify a protocol model, state design goals and security considerations, define security games, and provide a structural bandwidth comparison with recursive-STARK-based propagation.

ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC - Lightweight Mempool Propagation Without On-Path Proofs

TL;DR

AR-ACE is presented, in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation.

Abstract

In post-quantum blockchain settings, objects that require validity proofs (e.g., blob roots, execution-layer or consensus-layer signature aggregates) must be broadcast through mempool and relay networks. Recursive STARKs have been proposed to aggregate such proofs so that each node forwards one proof per tick plus objects without proofs, capping per-node proof bandwidth at roughly 128 KB degree per tick. We observe that propagation does not inherently require validity proofs on the path-only a lightweight assurance that an object is eligible for relay. We present AR-ACE (ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC), in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations (e.g., identity-bound signatures or commitments) and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof. Only the builder (or final verifier) performs a single aggregated validity proof over the set of objects it includes. This proof-off-path design removes proof overhead from the propagation path entirely, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation. When instantiated with ACE-GF-derived attestation keys, AR-ACE preserves a unified identity story with on-chain authorization and is PQC-ready. We specify a protocol model, state design goals and security considerations, define security games, and provide a structural bandwidth comparison with recursive-STARK-based propagation.
Paper Structure (45 sections, 3 theorems, 9 equations, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 45 sections, 3 theorems, 9 equations, 1 algorithm.

Table of Contents

  1. Keywords.
  2. Introduction
  3. The Bandwidth Problem in Post-Quantum Mempools
  4. Key Observation: What Must Be Proven on the Path?
  5. Contributions
  6. Relation to ACE-GF
  7. Paper Organization
  8. Related Work
  9. Recursive STARK mempool.
  10. Identity-centric authorization.
  11. Data availability and blobs.
  12. P2P gossip and relay networks.
  13. Account abstraction and relayers.
  14. Preliminaries and Assumptions
  15. Notation
  16. ...and 30 more sections

Key Result

Theorem 6.1

Assume EUF-CMA security gmr88 of the attestation signature scheme, collision resistance of $H$, and strict domain/nonce binding in the signed message. Then

Theorems & Definitions (6)

  • Theorem 6.1: Relay-path authentication and anti-replay
  • proof : Proof sketch
  • Theorem 6.2: Admission-policy soundness
  • proof : Proof sketch
  • Proposition 6.1: Inclusion safety under proof-off-path
  • proof : Proof sketch