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ZK-ACE: Identity-Centric Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Post-Quantum Blockchain Systems

Jian Sheng Wang

TL;DR

This work presents ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), an authorization layer that replaces transaction-carried signature objects entirely with identity-bound zero-knowledge authorization statements and demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in consensus-visible authorization data relative to direct post-quantum signature deployment.

Abstract

Post-quantum signature schemes introduce kilobyte-scale authorization artifacts when applied directly to blockchain transaction validation. A widely considered mitigation is to verify post-quantum signatures inside zero-knowledge circuits and publish only succinct proofs on-chain. However, this approach preserves the signature-centric authorization model, merely relocating the verification cost, and embeds expensive high-dimensional lattice arithmetic into prover circuits.We present ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), an authorization layer that replaces transaction-carried signature objects entirely with identity-bound zero-knowledge authorization statements. Rather than proving the correctness of a specific post-quantum signature, the prover demonstrates in zero knowledge that a transaction is authorized by an identity consistent with an on-chain commitment and bound replay state. The construction assumes a deterministic identity derivation primitive (DIDP) as a black box and uses a compact identity commitment as the primary on-chain identity anchor, supplemented by per-transaction replay-prevention state. We formalize ZK-ACE with explicit game-based security definitions for authorization soundness, replay resistance, substitution resistance, and cross-domain separation. We present a complete circuit constraint specification, define two replay-prevention models, and provide reduction-based security proofs under standard assumptions (knowledge soundness, collision resistance, and DIDP identity-root recovery hardness). A structural, protocol-level data accounting demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in consensus-visible authorization data relative to direct post-quantum signature deployment. The design supports batch aggregation and recursive proof composition, and is compatible with account-abstraction and rollup-based deployment architectures.

ZK-ACE: Identity-Centric Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Post-Quantum Blockchain Systems

TL;DR

This work presents ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), an authorization layer that replaces transaction-carried signature objects entirely with identity-bound zero-knowledge authorization statements and demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in consensus-visible authorization data relative to direct post-quantum signature deployment.

Abstract

Post-quantum signature schemes introduce kilobyte-scale authorization artifacts when applied directly to blockchain transaction validation. A widely considered mitigation is to verify post-quantum signatures inside zero-knowledge circuits and publish only succinct proofs on-chain. However, this approach preserves the signature-centric authorization model, merely relocating the verification cost, and embeds expensive high-dimensional lattice arithmetic into prover circuits.We present ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), an authorization layer that replaces transaction-carried signature objects entirely with identity-bound zero-knowledge authorization statements. Rather than proving the correctness of a specific post-quantum signature, the prover demonstrates in zero knowledge that a transaction is authorized by an identity consistent with an on-chain commitment and bound replay state. The construction assumes a deterministic identity derivation primitive (DIDP) as a black box and uses a compact identity commitment as the primary on-chain identity anchor, supplemented by per-transaction replay-prevention state. We formalize ZK-ACE with explicit game-based security definitions for authorization soundness, replay resistance, substitution resistance, and cross-domain separation. We present a complete circuit constraint specification, define two replay-prevention models, and provide reduction-based security proofs under standard assumptions (knowledge soundness, collision resistance, and DIDP identity-root recovery hardness). A structural, protocol-level data accounting demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in consensus-visible authorization data relative to direct post-quantum signature deployment. The design supports batch aggregation and recursive proof composition, and is compatible with account-abstraction and rollup-based deployment architectures.
Paper Structure (70 sections, 6 theorems, 11 equations, 3 tables, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 70 sections, 6 theorems, 11 equations, 3 tables, 1 algorithm.

Key Result

Theorem 8.1

Under (i) knowledge soundness of the proof system, (ii) collision resistance of $H$, and (iii) identity-root recovery hardness of the DIDP (Section sec:prelim:didp-security), for any $\mathsf{PPT}$ adversary $\mathcal{A}$:

Theorems & Definitions (19)

  • Remark 7.1
  • Remark 8.1: Mapping practical attack scenarios to formal games
  • Definition 8.1: Authorization Soundness Game
  • Remark 8.2: Strength of the adversarial model
  • Theorem 8.1: Authorization Soundness
  • proof
  • Definition 8.2: Replay-Resistance Game
  • Theorem 8.2: Replay Resistance
  • proof
  • Definition 8.3: Substitution-Resistance Game
  • ...and 9 more