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Condition-Triggered Cryptographic Asset Control via Dormant Authorization Paths

Jian Sheng Wang

TL;DR

Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP) is introduced, a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation.

Abstract

Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.

Condition-Triggered Cryptographic Asset Control via Dormant Authorization Paths

TL;DR

Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP) is introduced, a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation.

Abstract

Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.
Paper Structure (86 sections, 8 theorems, 25 equations, 1 figure, 5 tables, 3 algorithms)

This paper contains 86 sections, 8 theorems, 25 equations, 1 figure, 5 tables, 3 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Background and Motivation
  3. Limitations of Existing Approaches
  4. Permanent Key Possession.
  5. Multi-Signature and Threshold Schemes.
  6. Secret Sharing.
  7. Smart-Contract-Based Enforcement.
  8. Attribute-Based and Policy-Based Encryption.
  9. Time-Lock Cryptography.
  10. Custodial Models.
  11. Social Recovery.
  12. Problem Statement
  13. Core Insight
  14. Proposed Approach
  15. Contributions
  16. ...and 71 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 7.1

For any two roots $\mathsf{REV}_0, \mathsf{REV}_1$ of equal length, let $\mathsf{SA}_b = \textsf{ACE-GF}\xspace.\mathsf{Seal}(\mathsf{params}, \mathsf{Cred}_{\mathrm{composite}}, \mathsf{REV}_b)$ for $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}$. For any PPT $\mathcal{A}$ that does not know $\mathsf{Cred}_{ where the right-hand side is the IND-CPA advantage against AES-256-GCM-SIV rfc8452.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: Isolation and redundancy of authorization paths. Each path uses a unique context tuple and independent authorization factors. Destroying a factor revokes the corresponding path without affecting the root or other paths.

Theorems & Definitions (26)

  • Definition 3.1: Root-Derivable Framework
  • Definition 3.2: Required Security Properties
  • Definition 3.3: CT-DAP Syntax
  • Definition 3.4: Authorization Path
  • Lemma 7.1: Sealing Indistinguishability
  • proof
  • Lemma 7.2: Credential Brute-Force Resistance
  • proof
  • Remark 7.1: On the random oracle model for Argon2id
  • Lemma 7.3: PRF Security of $\mathsf{Derive}$
  • ...and 16 more