Visualizing Coalition Formation: From Hedonic Games to Image Segmentation
Pedro Henrique de Paula França, Lucas Lopes Felipe, Daniel Sadoc Menasché
TL;DR
This work links multi-agent systems with image segmentation by quantifying the impact of mechanism design parameters on equilibrium structures by observing transitions from cohesive to fragmented yet recoverable equilibria, and finally to intrinsic failure under excessive fragmentation.
Abstract
We propose image segmentation as a visual diagnostic testbed for coalition formation in hedonic games. Modeling pixels as agents on a graph, we study how a granularization parameter shapes equilibrium fragmentation and boundary structure. On the Weizmann single-object benchmark, we relate multi-coalition equilibria to binary protocols by measuring whether the converged coalitions overlap with a foreground ground-truth. We observe transitions from cohesive to fragmented yet recoverable equilibria, and finally to intrinsic failure under excessive fragmentation. Our core contribution links multi-agent systems with image segmentation by quantifying the impact of mechanism design parameters on equilibrium structures.
