Autobidding Equilibria in Sponsored Shopping
Paul Dütting, Yuhao Li, Renato Paes Leme, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng
TL;DR
This work analyzes two prevalent auction formats: Generalized Second-Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), establishing the universal existence of an Autobidding Equilibrium for both settings and proving a tight Price of Anarchy (PoA) of 2 for both mechanisms.
Abstract
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve advertisers with broad catalogs of distinct products. In these auctions, a single advertiser can secure multiple slots simultaneously to promote different items within the same query. This creates a fundamental complexity: the allocation is combinatorial, as advertisers simultaneously win a bundle of slots rather than a single position. We study this setting through the lens of autobidding, where value-maximizing agents employ uniform bidding strategies to optimize total value subject to Return-on-Investment (ROI) constraints. We analyze two prevalent auction formats: Generalized Second-Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). Our first main contribution is establishing the universal existence of an Autobidding Equilibrium for both settings. Second, we prove a tight Price of Anarchy (PoA) of 2 for both mechanisms.