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Private and Robust Contribution Evaluation in Federated Learning

Delio Jaramillo Velez, Gergely Biczok, Alexandre Graell i Amat, Johan Ostman, Balazs Pejo

TL;DR

Fair-Private satisfies standard fairness axioms, while Everybody-Else eliminates self-evaluation and provides resistance to manipulation, addressing a largely overlooked vulnerability, offering a principled solution for real-world cross-silo deployments.

Abstract

Cross-silo federated learning allows multiple organizations to collaboratively train machine learning models without sharing raw data, but client updates can still leak sensitive information through inference attacks. Secure aggregation protects privacy by hiding individual updates, yet it complicates contribution evaluation, which is critical for fair rewards and detecting low-quality or malicious participants. Existing marginal-contribution methods, such as the Shapley value, are incompatible with secure aggregation, and practical alternatives, such as Leave-One-Out, are crude and rely on self-evaluation. We introduce two marginal-difference contribution scores compatible with secure aggregation. Fair-Private satisfies standard fairness axioms, while Everybody-Else eliminates self-evaluation and provides resistance to manipulation, addressing a largely overlooked vulnerability. We provide theoretical guarantees for fairness, privacy, robustness, and computational efficiency, and evaluate our methods on multiple medical image datasets and CIFAR10 in cross-silo settings. Our scores consistently outperform existing baselines, better approximate Shapley-induced client rankings, and improve downstream model performance as well as misbehavior detection. These results demonstrate that fairness, privacy, robustness, and practical utility can be achieved jointly in federated contribution evaluation, offering a principled solution for real-world cross-silo deployments.

Private and Robust Contribution Evaluation in Federated Learning

TL;DR

Fair-Private satisfies standard fairness axioms, while Everybody-Else eliminates self-evaluation and provides resistance to manipulation, addressing a largely overlooked vulnerability, offering a principled solution for real-world cross-silo deployments.

Abstract

Cross-silo federated learning allows multiple organizations to collaboratively train machine learning models without sharing raw data, but client updates can still leak sensitive information through inference attacks. Secure aggregation protects privacy by hiding individual updates, yet it complicates contribution evaluation, which is critical for fair rewards and detecting low-quality or malicious participants. Existing marginal-contribution methods, such as the Shapley value, are incompatible with secure aggregation, and practical alternatives, such as Leave-One-Out, are crude and rely on self-evaluation. We introduce two marginal-difference contribution scores compatible with secure aggregation. Fair-Private satisfies standard fairness axioms, while Everybody-Else eliminates self-evaluation and provides resistance to manipulation, addressing a largely overlooked vulnerability. We provide theoretical guarantees for fairness, privacy, robustness, and computational efficiency, and evaluate our methods on multiple medical image datasets and CIFAR10 in cross-silo settings. Our scores consistently outperform existing baselines, better approximate Shapley-induced client rankings, and improve downstream model performance as well as misbehavior detection. These results demonstrate that fairness, privacy, robustness, and practical utility can be achieved jointly in federated contribution evaluation, offering a principled solution for real-world cross-silo deployments.
Paper Structure (30 sections, 3 theorems, 8 equations, 3 figures, 8 tables)

This paper contains 30 sections, 3 theorems, 8 equations, 3 figures, 8 tables.

Key Result

Theorem 1

$\mathtt{FP}$ satisfies Properties ax:eff, ax:null, ax:sym, and ax:priv.

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: Various CE scores for a scenario with 4 clients ($\mu=0.5$) at the 10th communication round using the ISIC2019 dataset.
  • Figure 2: The negative loss of the global model on the CIFAR10 (left), and ISIC2019 (right) datasets. Training is for $9$ clients with $10$ communication rounds, and the results of mean and variance are reported for the 10th run.
  • Figure 3: Misbehavior detection score (what is the probability that the attacker gets the lowest score) on the CIFAR10 (left), and ISIC2019 (right) datasets. Training is for $9$ clients with $10$ communication rounds, and results are reported for the 10th run.

Theorems & Definitions (10)

  • Definition 1: Shapley value shapley1951notes
  • Definition 2: Leave-One-Out
  • Definition 3: Fair-Private
  • Theorem 1: Properties of $\mathtt{FP}$
  • Definition 4: Everybody-Else
  • Example 1: Three clients
  • Theorem 2: Properties of $\mathtt{EE}$
  • Example 2
  • Theorem 3: Complexity
  • Remark 1