Complexity and Misspecification
Drew Fudenberg, Florian Mudekereza
TL;DR
The paper develops a tractable framework that combines concerns about model misspecification with a preference for simplicity by penalizing the entropy of worst-case distortions. This leads to Gibbs-type distortions and a dynamic learning environment in which complexity aversion can eliminate cycles and steer decisions toward safer actions, with welfare gains when safety aligns with the true data-generating process. The approach yields microfoundations for empirical phenomena such as scale heterogeneity in discrete choice, probability neglect, and home bias in international finance, and connects to rational inattention and stochastic growth literature through an information-theoretic lens. Methodologically, the paper derives closed-form distortions, envelope results, and ARC representations, and provides a rich set of applications and welfare implications for long-run decision making under uncertainty.
Abstract
We propose a tractable unified framework to study the evolution and interaction of model-misspecification concerns and complexity aversion in repeated decision problems. This aims to capture environments where decision makers worry that their models are misspecified while also disliking overly complex models. We find that pathological cycles caused by endogenous concerns for misspecification can be eliminated by penalizing complex models and show that such preferences for simplicity tend to favor safety, which can enhance welfare in the long run. We use our framework to provide new microfoundations for pervasive empirical phenomena such as "scale heterogeneity" in discrete-choice analysis, "probability neglect" in behavioral economics, and "home bias" in international finance.
