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Cooperative Game Theory Model for Sustainable UN Financing: Addressing Global Public Goods Provision

Labib Shami, Teddy Lazebnik

Abstract

This study introduces a novel cooperative game theory model designed to improve the United Nations' current funding mechanisms, which predominantly rely on voluntary contributions. By shifting from a Nash equilibrium framework, where member states act in self-interest, to a cooperative model, the proposed approach aligns each country's financial contributions with the benefits they derive from UN activities. The model ensures a more sustainable and equitable system by introducing personalized pricing based on derived utility. Using agent-based simulations, the research demonstrates that the suggested approach increases global utility, reduces free-rider issues, and creates a more efficient resource allocation system. The findings suggest that the proposed model can optimize UN funding, ensuring a more stable and effective framework for global public goods provision, while considering the varying economic capacities of member states. Further research is recommended to assess the political viability of the model.

Cooperative Game Theory Model for Sustainable UN Financing: Addressing Global Public Goods Provision

Abstract

This study introduces a novel cooperative game theory model designed to improve the United Nations' current funding mechanisms, which predominantly rely on voluntary contributions. By shifting from a Nash equilibrium framework, where member states act in self-interest, to a cooperative model, the proposed approach aligns each country's financial contributions with the benefits they derive from UN activities. The model ensures a more sustainable and equitable system by introducing personalized pricing based on derived utility. Using agent-based simulations, the research demonstrates that the suggested approach increases global utility, reduces free-rider issues, and creates a more efficient resource allocation system. The findings suggest that the proposed model can optimize UN funding, ensuring a more stable and effective framework for global public goods provision, while considering the varying economic capacities of member states. Further research is recommended to assess the political viability of the model.
Paper Structure (6 sections, 4 theorems, 19 equations, 1 figure)

This paper contains 6 sections, 4 theorems, 19 equations, 1 figure.

Table of Contents

  1. Related work
  2. The United Nations' funding models and their development
  3. The provision of public goods
  4. Public goods economy with asymmetric agents
  5. Computer simulation
  6. Discussion and conclusion

Key Result

Theorem 1

For the proposed economy, a unique Nash allocation exists.

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: A simulation of UN member countries resource allocation with 10 UN offices for all countries and 10 local offices for each country. The simulation is computed for $n = 100$ times, each time with slightly different initial conditions. The blue (solid) line presents the average of the simulations. The green vertical line indicates the average duration taken to coverage into the Trading equilibria.

Theorems & Definitions (10)

  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2
  • Theorem 1
  • proof
  • Theorem 2
  • proof
  • Theorem 3
  • proof
  • Theorem 4
  • proof