Evaluation of Security-Induced Latency on 5G RAN Interfaces and User Plane Communication
Sotiris Michaelides, Jakub Lapawa, Daniel Eguiguren Chavez, Martin Henze
TL;DR
This study assesses how optional security controls across internal 5G RAN interfaces and the user plane impact latency in disaggregated RAN deployments. It introduces the first open-source testbed enabling end-to-end evaluation with CP/UP separation and security over F1-C, F1-U, and E1 links, and demonstrates that IPsec generally adds only small overhead on UP paths while DTLS incurs higher costs. Across a full UP path, disaggregated RANs maintain a latency advantage over monolithic designs, but cryptographic processing pushes end-to-end RTT beyond $1\,\mathrm{ms}$ in practice. The work provides practical guidance for secure, low-latency 5G deployments and highlights that achieving sub-$1\,\mathrm{ms}$ RTT will require reducing or rearchitecting cryptographic operations and potentially adopting end-to-end security models.
Abstract
5G promises enhanced performance-not only in bandwidth and capacity, but also latency and security. Its ultra-reliable low-latency configuration targets round-trip times below 1 ms, while optional security controls extend protection across all interfaces, making 5G attractive for mission-critical applications. A key enabler of low latency is the disaggregation of network components, including the RAN, allowing user-plane functions to be deployed nearer to end users. However, this split introduces additional interfaces, whose protection increases latency overhead. In this paper, guided by discussions with a network operator and a 5G manufacturer, we evaluate the latency overhead of enabling optional 5G security controls across internal RAN interfaces and the 5G user plane. To this end, we deploy the first testbed implementing a disaggregated RAN with standardized optional security mechanisms. Our results show that disaggregated RAN deployments retain a latency advantage over monolithic designs, even with security enabled. However, achieving sub-1 ms round-trip times remains challenging, as cryptographic overhead alone can already exceed this target.
