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Distortion of Metric Voting with Bounded Randomness

Ziyi Cai, D. D. Gao, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang

TL;DR

This work shows that breaking the distortion barrier of $3$ in metric voting is possible with strictly bounded randomness. By developing and combining RepApx variants of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries within the biased-metric framework, the authors construct a rule that samples from a constant-size candidate list and achieves distortion $\le 3 - \varepsilon$. The analysis pivots on robust distortion bounds for Maximal Lotteries, near-3 distortion for RepApx Maximal Lotteries, and controlled distortion for RepApx Stable Lotteries, all tied together via a mixing strategy that works under both consistent and inconsistent biased metrics. The results yield a polynomial-time method to identify suitable constant-size multisets and imply practical implications for fixed-size winner lists in committee selection, with broader connections to multi-winner settings and interpretability concerns.

Abstract

We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost of reduced transparency and interpretability. In this work, we explore the trade-off between these paradigms by asking whether it is possible to break the distortion barrier of $3$ using only "bounded" randomness. We answer in the affirmative by presenting a voting rule that (1) achieves distortion of at most $3 - \varepsilon$ for some absolute constant $\varepsilon > 0$, and (2) selects a winner uniformly at random from a deterministically identified list of constant size. Our analysis builds on new structural results for the distortion and approximation of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries.

Distortion of Metric Voting with Bounded Randomness

TL;DR

This work shows that breaking the distortion barrier of in metric voting is possible with strictly bounded randomness. By developing and combining RepApx variants of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries within the biased-metric framework, the authors construct a rule that samples from a constant-size candidate list and achieves distortion . The analysis pivots on robust distortion bounds for Maximal Lotteries, near-3 distortion for RepApx Maximal Lotteries, and controlled distortion for RepApx Stable Lotteries, all tied together via a mixing strategy that works under both consistent and inconsistent biased metrics. The results yield a polynomial-time method to identify suitable constant-size multisets and imply practical implications for fixed-size winner lists in committee selection, with broader connections to multi-winner settings and interpretability concerns.

Abstract

We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least , and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than , often at the cost of reduced transparency and interpretability. In this work, we explore the trade-off between these paradigms by asking whether it is possible to break the distortion barrier of using only "bounded" randomness. We answer in the affirmative by presenting a voting rule that (1) achieves distortion of at most for some absolute constant , and (2) selects a winner uniformly at random from a deterministically identified list of constant size. Our analysis builds on new structural results for the distortion and approximation of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries.
Paper Structure (40 sections, 27 theorems, 111 equations, 5 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 40 sections, 27 theorems, 111 equations, 5 figures, 1 table.

Key Result

Lemma 2.2

For any three strategies $X, Y$, and $Z$, we have

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: $\ell(D, t)$ and $r(t)$.
  • Figure 2: Partition of the interval $[0, 1]$ induced by the preference order $d \succ_v c \succ_v b \succ_v a$. The multiset is $S = \left\{a, a, b, c, c, c\right\}$. To compute $\mathop{\mathrm{\mathbf{Pr}}}\limits\limits_{}{\left[c \succ_v S\right]}$, we sample $X_1, \dots, X_6$ and $Z$ independently from the corresponding subintervals of $[0, 1]$. In this example, we have $\mathop{\mathrm{\mathbf{Pr}}}\limits\limits_{}{\left[c \succ_v S\right]} = \mathop{\mathrm{\mathbf{Pr}}}\limits\limits_{}{\left[\max\left\{X_1, \dots, X_6\right\} < Z\right]} = 1/4.$
  • Figure 3: Pictorial illustration of $\ell(D_\mathrm{ML}, t)$ v.s. $r(t)$, and $\ell(D_{\varepsilon^2\text{-}\mathrm{ML}}, t)$ v.s. $r(t) + 2\varepsilon$
  • Figure 4: Pictorial illustration of $\ell(D, t)$ and $r(t) + 2\varepsilon$
  • Figure 5: Pictorial illustration of $f_1(p)$, $f_2(p)$, and $f_3(p)$.

Theorems & Definitions (74)

  • proof : Proof of \ref{['fac:set2dis']}
  • Lemma 2.2: see, e.g., DBLP:journals/jacm/CharikarRWW24
  • Definition 2.3: Pseudometric Space
  • Definition 2.4: Metric Distortion
  • Definition 2.5: Biased Metrics
  • proof : Proof of \ref{['fac:d_to_s_1']}
  • proof : Proof of \ref{['fac:d_to_s_2']}
  • Theorem 2.8: DBLP:journals/jacm/CharikarRWW24
  • proof : Proof of \ref{['thm:biased_metric']}
  • Corollary 2.9: DBLP:conf/soda/CharikarR22DBLP:journals/jacm/CharikarRWW24
  • ...and 64 more