Distortion of Metric Voting with Bounded Randomness
Ziyi Cai, D. D. Gao, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang
TL;DR
This work shows that breaking the distortion barrier of $3$ in metric voting is possible with strictly bounded randomness. By developing and combining RepApx variants of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries within the biased-metric framework, the authors construct a rule that samples from a constant-size candidate list and achieves distortion $\le 3 - \varepsilon$. The analysis pivots on robust distortion bounds for Maximal Lotteries, near-3 distortion for RepApx Maximal Lotteries, and controlled distortion for RepApx Stable Lotteries, all tied together via a mixing strategy that works under both consistent and inconsistent biased metrics. The results yield a polynomial-time method to identify suitable constant-size multisets and imply practical implications for fixed-size winner lists in committee selection, with broader connections to multi-winner settings and interpretability concerns.
Abstract
We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost of reduced transparency and interpretability. In this work, we explore the trade-off between these paradigms by asking whether it is possible to break the distortion barrier of $3$ using only "bounded" randomness. We answer in the affirmative by presenting a voting rule that (1) achieves distortion of at most $3 - \varepsilon$ for some absolute constant $\varepsilon > 0$, and (2) selects a winner uniformly at random from a deterministically identified list of constant size. Our analysis builds on new structural results for the distortion and approximation of Maximal Lotteries and Stable Lotteries.
