Temperature Scaling Attack Disrupting Model Confidence in Federated Learning
Kichang Lee, Jaeho Jin, JaeYeon Park, Songkuk Kim, JeongGil Ko
TL;DR
This work identifies predictive confidence calibration as a distinct, actionable attack surface in federated learning and introduces the Temperature Scaling Attack (TSA), a training-time mechanism that degrades calibration by injecting temperature scaling into local updates while preserving accuracy. The authors establish an effective-step-size invariance via learning-rate–temperature coupling, $eta=rac{ ilde{eta}}{ au}$, and provide a non-convex convergence analysis showing stable optimization under non-IID data despite miscalibration. Empirically, TSA delivers large calibration errors (e.g., up to +145% ECE on CIFAR-100) with minimal accuracy changes and remains effective against robust aggregation and post-hoc calibration defenses, as demonstrated across MNIST, CIFAR, healthcare, robotics, and language-generation case studies. The results highlight calibration integrity as a critical, under-defended facet of FL, motivating calibration-aware auditing and defenses to protect safety-critical decision pipelines relying on probabilistic confidence.
Abstract
Predictive confidence serves as a foundational control signal in mission-critical systems, directly governing risk-aware logic such as escalation, abstention, and conservative fallback. While prior federated learning attacks predominantly target accuracy or implant backdoors, we identify confidence calibration as a distinct attack objective. We present the Temperature Scaling Attack (TSA), a training-time attack that degrades calibration while preserving accuracy. By injecting temperature scaling with learning rate-temperature coupling during local training, malicious updates maintain benign-like optimization behavior, evading accuracy-based monitoring and similarity-based detection. We provide a convergence analysis under non-IID settings, showing that this coupling preserves standard convergence bounds while systematically distorting confidence. Across three benchmarks, TSA substantially shifts calibration (e.g., 145% error increase on CIFAR-100) with <2 accuracy change, and remains effective under robust aggregation and post-hoc calibration defenses. Case studies further show that confidence manipulation can cause up to 7.2x increases in missed critical cases (healthcare) or false alarms (autonomous driving), even when accuracy is unchanged. Overall, our results establish calibration integrity as a critical attack surface in federated learning.
