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Nested search

Yutong Zhang

TL;DR

The paper introduces a nested search model on a rooted tree where information about prizes is revealed progressively along paths and where prize realizations are correlated via shared ancestry. It establishes that an index policy, with node-specific indices defined recursively, is optimal, and provides a constructive proof through a three-step argument that yields a discrete-choice reformulation. The author then applies this framework to a two-stage pricing game with drip pricing, deriving equilibrium prices under stage-1 and stage-2 revelation and showing that early price disclosure can lower final prices and raise consumer surplus under regulation. The findings offer a tractable, implementable approach to dynamic search problems with structured uncertainty and have practical implications for regulation and market design in contexts like monopolistic competition and e-commerce.

Abstract

I introduce and study a nested search problem modeled as a tree structure that generalizes Weitzman (1979) in two ways: (1) search progresses incrementally, reflecting real-life scenarios where agents gradually acquire information about the prizes; and (2) the realization of prizes can be correlated, capturing similarities among them. I derive the optimal policy, which takes the form of an index solution. I apply this result to study monopolistic competition in a market with two stages of product inspection. My application illustrates that regulations on drip pricing lower equilibrium price and raise consumer surplus.

Nested search

TL;DR

The paper introduces a nested search model on a rooted tree where information about prizes is revealed progressively along paths and where prize realizations are correlated via shared ancestry. It establishes that an index policy, with node-specific indices defined recursively, is optimal, and provides a constructive proof through a three-step argument that yields a discrete-choice reformulation. The author then applies this framework to a two-stage pricing game with drip pricing, deriving equilibrium prices under stage-1 and stage-2 revelation and showing that early price disclosure can lower final prices and raise consumer surplus under regulation. The findings offer a tractable, implementable approach to dynamic search problems with structured uncertainty and have practical implications for regulation and market design in contexts like monopolistic competition and e-commerce.

Abstract

I introduce and study a nested search problem modeled as a tree structure that generalizes Weitzman (1979) in two ways: (1) search progresses incrementally, reflecting real-life scenarios where agents gradually acquire information about the prizes; and (2) the realization of prizes can be correlated, capturing similarities among them. I derive the optimal policy, which takes the form of an index solution. I apply this result to study monopolistic competition in a market with two stages of product inspection. My application illustrates that regulations on drip pricing lower equilibrium price and raise consumer surplus.
Paper Structure (30 sections, 24 theorems, 48 equations)

This paper contains 30 sections, 24 theorems, 48 equations.

Key Result

Theorem 1

The index policy maximizes the agent's expected payoff.

Theorems & Definitions (29)

  • Remark 1
  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2
  • Theorem 1
  • Lemma 1
  • Lemma 2
  • Lemma 3
  • Lemma 4
  • Lemma 5
  • Proposition 1
  • ...and 19 more