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Prefix Consensus For Censorship Resistant BFT

Zhuolun Xiang, Andrei Tonkikh, Alexander Spiegelman

TL;DR

This work introduces Prefix Consensus, a censorship-resistant BFT primitive where input vectors yield two outputs $(v^{\sf low}, v^{\sf high})$ that extend the honest parties' common prefix rather than a single agreed value. It proves an asynchronous 3-round solution under optimal resilience $n=3f+1$, and then strengthens it to Strong Prefix Consensus, which enforces agreement on the high output via a leaderless, partially synchronous construction. Building on this, the authors design a leaderless, multi-slot BFT SMR protocol that achieves $f$-censorship resistance by iteratively demoting misbehaving proposers and using per-slot Strong Prefix Consensus on proposal hashes. They also connect Prefix Consensus to Graded and Binary/Validated Consensus, obtaining optimal-latency graded consensus (3 message delays) and leaderless Binary/Validated Consensus with $O(n^3)$ message complexity and $O(n^4)$ communication. Overall, Prefix Consensus provides a rigorous, asynchronous foundation for censorship-resistant, leaderless BFT, with practical multi-slot instantiations and strong latency/complexity guarantees for core primitives and their extensions.

Abstract

Despite broad use of BFT consensus in blockchains, censorship resistance is weak: leaders can exclude transactions, a growing concern for trading and DeFi. We address this by introducing a new abstraction and protocol stack. First, we introduce \emph{Prefix Consensus}, where parties input vectors and output $(v^{\sf low},v^{\sf high})$ that (i) extend the maximum common prefix of honest inputs and (ii) satisfy $v_i^{\sf low}\preceq v_j^{\sf high}$ for all honest $i,j$. Unlike classical consensus, no single output is required. We show Prefix Consensus is solvable asynchronously and give tight round-complexity bounds. We then define \emph{Strong Prefix Consensus}, requiring agreement on the \emph{high} output. Our protocol is leaderless and partially synchronous: one Prefix Consensus instance decides (possibly different) lows, and additional instances yield a unique safe-to-extend high, even if an adversary can suspend one party per round. We lift this to a leaderless, multi-proposer, censorship-resistant BFT SMR protocol: per slot, all parties broadcast proposals, deterministically rank them, and run one Strong Prefix Consensus on proposal hashes, committing honest proposals in \emph{four rounds}. A deterministic demotion rule updates the ranking when a party's proposal is excluded, implying that after GST at most $f$ slots can miss an honest proposal while progress remains leaderless under suspension and up to $f{-}1$ Byzantine faults. Finally, we connect Prefix Consensus to graded and binary/validated consensus: we obtain an optimal-latency graded consensus (3 message delays) and leaderless Binary/Validated Consensus with worst-case message complexity $O(n^3)$ and communication $O(n^4)$.

Prefix Consensus For Censorship Resistant BFT

TL;DR

This work introduces Prefix Consensus, a censorship-resistant BFT primitive where input vectors yield two outputs that extend the honest parties' common prefix rather than a single agreed value. It proves an asynchronous 3-round solution under optimal resilience , and then strengthens it to Strong Prefix Consensus, which enforces agreement on the high output via a leaderless, partially synchronous construction. Building on this, the authors design a leaderless, multi-slot BFT SMR protocol that achieves -censorship resistance by iteratively demoting misbehaving proposers and using per-slot Strong Prefix Consensus on proposal hashes. They also connect Prefix Consensus to Graded and Binary/Validated Consensus, obtaining optimal-latency graded consensus (3 message delays) and leaderless Binary/Validated Consensus with message complexity and communication. Overall, Prefix Consensus provides a rigorous, asynchronous foundation for censorship-resistant, leaderless BFT, with practical multi-slot instantiations and strong latency/complexity guarantees for core primitives and their extensions.

Abstract

Despite broad use of BFT consensus in blockchains, censorship resistance is weak: leaders can exclude transactions, a growing concern for trading and DeFi. We address this by introducing a new abstraction and protocol stack. First, we introduce \emph{Prefix Consensus}, where parties input vectors and output that (i) extend the maximum common prefix of honest inputs and (ii) satisfy for all honest . Unlike classical consensus, no single output is required. We show Prefix Consensus is solvable asynchronously and give tight round-complexity bounds. We then define \emph{Strong Prefix Consensus}, requiring agreement on the \emph{high} output. Our protocol is leaderless and partially synchronous: one Prefix Consensus instance decides (possibly different) lows, and additional instances yield a unique safe-to-extend high, even if an adversary can suspend one party per round. We lift this to a leaderless, multi-proposer, censorship-resistant BFT SMR protocol: per slot, all parties broadcast proposals, deterministically rank them, and run one Strong Prefix Consensus on proposal hashes, committing honest proposals in \emph{four rounds}. A deterministic demotion rule updates the ranking when a party's proposal is excluded, implying that after GST at most slots can miss an honest proposal while progress remains leaderless under suspension and up to Byzantine faults. Finally, we connect Prefix Consensus to graded and binary/validated consensus: we obtain an optimal-latency graded consensus (3 message delays) and leaderless Binary/Validated Consensus with worst-case message complexity and communication .
Paper Structure (102 sections, 45 theorems, 20 equations, 2 figures, 5 algorithms)

This paper contains 102 sections, 45 theorems, 20 equations, 2 figures, 5 algorithms.

Key Result

Theorem 1.1

Three communication rounds are necessary and sufficient to solve Prefix Consensus in an asynchronous Byzantine setting under optimal resilience.

Figures (2)

  • Figure 1: Executions $\rho_0$, $\rho_1$, and $\rho^*$ used in the lower-bound proof. For clarity, messages to Byzantine parties and messages sent at or after $2\hat{\delta}$ are omitted from the picture.
  • Figure 2: Executions $\rho_1$, $\rho_1'$, and $\rho_1"$ from the proof of \ref{['lem:lb:rho-one']}. For clarity, messages to Byzantine parties and messages sent at or after $2\hat{\delta}$ are omitted from the picture.

Theorems & Definitions (57)

  • Theorem 1.1: Informal
  • Definition 1: Leaderless Termination (informal) antoniadis2021leaderless
  • Definition 2: Prefix Consensus
  • Corollary 1
  • Theorem 2.1
  • Definition 3: Strong Prefix Consensus
  • Definition 4: Multi-slot Consensus
  • Definition 5: Censorship Resistance
  • Definition 6: Commit Latency
  • Definition 7: Slot Latency
  • ...and 47 more