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QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks

Seyed Ali Ghazi Asgar, Narasimha Reddy

TL;DR

This work addresses the risk of IP exposure from acoustic side-channel leakage during 3D printing. It introduces Stealth Head Movement (SHM), a defense that obfuscates motion patterns by extending toolpaths within a bounding region through small G-code edits, avoiding any extra hardware. The authors demonstrate that acoustic leakage from stepper motors and cooling fans can reveal nozzle movement, but SHM can prevent accurate reconstruction while adding a controllable print-time overhead. The approach is fully compatible with existing printers and offers a practical, hardware-free mitigation with measurable security benefits for 3D printing workflows.

Abstract

The 3D printing market has experienced significant growth in recent years, with an estimated revenue of 15 billion USD for 2025. Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process whether through the machine itself, the supply chain, or the fabricated components are becoming increasingly common. One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file. One method for carrying out such theft is through side-channel attacks. In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers against such attacks. The primary advantage of our approach is that it requires no additional hardware, such as large speakers or noise-canceling devices. Instead, it secures printed parts by minimal modifications to the G-code.

QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks

TL;DR

This work addresses the risk of IP exposure from acoustic side-channel leakage during 3D printing. It introduces Stealth Head Movement (SHM), a defense that obfuscates motion patterns by extending toolpaths within a bounding region through small G-code edits, avoiding any extra hardware. The authors demonstrate that acoustic leakage from stepper motors and cooling fans can reveal nozzle movement, but SHM can prevent accurate reconstruction while adding a controllable print-time overhead. The approach is fully compatible with existing printers and offers a practical, hardware-free mitigation with measurable security benefits for 3D printing workflows.

Abstract

The 3D printing market has experienced significant growth in recent years, with an estimated revenue of 15 billion USD for 2025. Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process whether through the machine itself, the supply chain, or the fabricated components are becoming increasingly common. One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file. One method for carrying out such theft is through side-channel attacks. In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers against such attacks. The primary advantage of our approach is that it requires no additional hardware, such as large speakers or noise-canceling devices. Instead, it secures printed parts by minimal modifications to the G-code.
Paper Structure (18 sections, 4 equations, 11 figures, 1 table, 2 algorithms)

This paper contains 18 sections, 4 equations, 11 figures, 1 table, 2 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Previous Works and Side-Channel Leakage
  3. Acoustic side-channel
  4. Terminology used in additive manufacturing
  5. Threat Model
  6. Data Acquisition Setup
  7. Hardware
  8. Sources of Acoustic Information
  9. Power Supply
  10. Stepper motors
  11. Cooling Fans
  12. Synchronizing Location with Audio
  13. Reconstructing Location from Audio
  14. Defense Method
  15. Distinguishable audio pattern at transition points
  16. ...and 3 more sections

Figures (11)

  • Figure 1: Sources of acoustic noise.
  • Figure 2: Linear interpolation of audio energy to horizontal motion.
  • Figure 3: Predicting the nozzle motion along the X-axis using randomized movements.
  • Figure 4: G-code of the test object with horizontal slicing angle and microphone's position.
  • Figure 5: (a) Nozzle positions along the X-axis overlaid on the spectrogram of the corresponding audio. (b) Zoomed-in view of the time range between 100 and 150 seconds, and the frequency range from 6 kHz to 9 kHz. (c) Zoomed-in view of the time range between 100 and 150 seconds, and the frequency range from 0 to 1 kHz. Nozzle position along the X-axis is shown in green.
  • ...and 6 more figures