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"Sail Fast, Then Wait" in First-come, First-served Port Queues: Information Sharing for Sustainable Shipping

Ayato Kitadai, Shunta Yoshimura, Takuya Nakashima, Noora Torpo, Rei Miratsu, Naoki Mizutani, Nariaki Nishino

TL;DR

This work formalizes SFTW as the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a finite-player FCFS bottleneck game with private earliest-arrival capabilities. It shows that sharing information about these capabilities expands the equilibrium set and identifies a focal Green Navigation outcome that preserves service order while enabling slower, more energy-efficient sailing. Empirically, AIS data from Port Hedland reveal substantial offshore queues (mean ~$100$ hours) but limited practical slack under current information asymmetry, while a counterfactual analysis indicates about $1.54$ hours of additional slack per voyage could be unlocked through information sharing, implying meaningful emissions reductions. Overall, the study provides a theoretical and empirical foundation for using information transparency as a practical tool to move toward sustainable shipping within existing FCFS port policies.

Abstract

This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We formulate a competitive navigating environment as an incomplete information game where players strategically decide their arrival time within heterogeneous feasible sets under First-Come, First-Served port policy. Our results show that in incomplete information settings, SFTW emerges as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, under complete information, the set of equilibria expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without compromising service order. We further quantitatively evaluate the effect of information enrichment based on empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others' private information can effectively reduce SFTW and enable more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable operations.

"Sail Fast, Then Wait" in First-come, First-served Port Queues: Information Sharing for Sustainable Shipping

TL;DR

This work formalizes SFTW as the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a finite-player FCFS bottleneck game with private earliest-arrival capabilities. It shows that sharing information about these capabilities expands the equilibrium set and identifies a focal Green Navigation outcome that preserves service order while enabling slower, more energy-efficient sailing. Empirically, AIS data from Port Hedland reveal substantial offshore queues (mean ~ hours) but limited practical slack under current information asymmetry, while a counterfactual analysis indicates about hours of additional slack per voyage could be unlocked through information sharing, implying meaningful emissions reductions. Overall, the study provides a theoretical and empirical foundation for using information transparency as a practical tool to move toward sustainable shipping within existing FCFS port policies.

Abstract

This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We formulate a competitive navigating environment as an incomplete information game where players strategically decide their arrival time within heterogeneous feasible sets under First-Come, First-Served port policy. Our results show that in incomplete information settings, SFTW emerges as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, under complete information, the set of equilibria expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without compromising service order. We further quantitatively evaluate the effect of information enrichment based on empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others' private information can effectively reduce SFTW and enable more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable operations.
Paper Structure (19 sections, 5 theorems, 47 equations, 5 figures)

This paper contains 19 sections, 5 theorems, 47 equations, 5 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Literature Review
  3. Model
  4. Equilibrium Analysis
  5. Complete Information Game
  6. Incomplete Information Game
  7. Illustrative Example
  8. Evaluation of Information Sharing in the Real World Shipping
  9. Equilibrium Selection in Complete Information Environments
  10. AIS Data Processing and Parametrization
  11. Observation of Excessive Queuing
  12. Quantifying the Value of Information
  13. Discussion
  14. Conclusion
  15. Proof of the Equation (1)
  16. ...and 4 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 4.2

For any strategy profile $(s_1,\dots,s_n)$, if a player can improve her expected service order, she can strictly improve her payoff by that.

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: Equilibrium Arrival Pattern under Incomplete Information
  • Figure 2: Equilibrium Arrival Pattern under Complete Information
  • Figure 3: Visualisation of Slack: Potential for Slow Steaming
  • Figure 4: Distribution of Comprehensive Offshore Waiting Times. The heavy-tailed distribution with a mean of $100.73$ hours indicates excessive queuing consistent with SFTW behaviour.
  • Figure 5: Distribution of Calculated Slack Hours (Potential Slow Steaming Duration)

Theorems & Definitions (12)

  • Definition 4.1
  • Lemma 4.2
  • Lemma 4.3
  • Lemma 4.4
  • proof
  • Theorem 4.5
  • Theorem 4.6
  • proof
  • proof
  • proof
  • ...and 2 more