A forward algorithm for a class of Markov zero-sum stopping games
Nhat-Thang Le
TL;DR
We present a forward-type algorithm for a class of Markov zero-sum stopping games on finite state spaces, extending the one-player forward algorithm to two competing players. The method constructs a decreasing sequence of value functions $V_k$ and shrinking sets $S_k$ that converge in finite steps to the game's value $V$ while recovering the critical regions where $V$ hits $\\psi$ or $\\phi$; the termination bound is below $|E|^2$ steps. Theoretical guarantees ensure a Nash equilibrium and finite termination, and we illustrate the approach with computational examples on birth-death processes and random walks, highlighting the potential for multiple NE in certain constructions. The framework provides a practical tool for computing the value and understanding the structure of NE in Markov stopping games with wide-ranging potential applications in economics and finance.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new efficient algorithm to compute the value function for zero-sum stopping games featuring two players with opposing interests. This can be seen as a game version of the ''forward algorithm'' for (one-player) optimal stopping problem, first introduced by Irle [6] for discrete-time Markov processes and later revisited by Miclo \& Villeneuve [8] for continuous-time Markov processes on general state spaces. This paper focuses on a game driven by a homogeneous Markov process taking values in a finite state space and also discusses about the number of iterations needed. Illustrated computational implementations for a few particular examples are also provided.
