Evolving Interpretable Constitutions for Multi-Agent Simulation
Ujwal Kumar, Alice Saito, Hershraj Niranjani, Rayan Yessou, Phan Xuan Tan
TL;DR
The paper presents Constitutional Evolution, a framework that automatically discovers interpretable behavioral norms for multi-agent LLM systems by evolving constitutions with an LLM-guided optimizer in a grid-world setting. A welfare-based Stability Score combines productivity, survival, and conflict, and a multi-island MAP-Elites search yields an evolved constitution $C^*$ with $S=0.556\pm0.008$, dramatically outperforming hand-crafted and one-shot LLM baselines while enabling highly interpretable, rule-based coordination. The results show that operationally specific rules and reduced communication can dramatically boost productivity and stability, implying that implicit coordination via consistent behavior can trump verbose messaging. This work highlights the potential of evolutionary search to uncover context-specific norms for scalable, auditable multi-agent alignment, with limitations noted for transfer to more complex domains and calls for future research on broader environments and baselines.
Abstract
Constitutional AI has focused on single-model alignment using fixed principles. However, multi-agent systems create novel alignment challenges through emergent social dynamics. We present Constitutional Evolution, a framework for automatically discovering behavioral norms in multi-agent LLM systems. Using a grid-world simulation with survival pressure, we study the tension between individual and collective welfare, quantified via a Societal Stability Score S in [0,1] that combines productivity, survival, and conflict metrics. Adversarial constitutions lead to societal collapse (S= 0), while vague prosocial principles ("be helpful, harmless, honest") produce inconsistent coordination (S = 0.249). Even constitutions designed by Claude 4.5 Opus with explicit knowledge of the objective achieve only moderate performance (S= 0.332). Using LLM-driven genetic programming with multi-island evolution, we evolve constitutions maximizing social welfare without explicit guidance toward cooperation. The evolved constitution C* achieves S = 0.556 +/- 0.008 (123% higher than human-designed baselines, N = 10), eliminates conflict, and discovers that minimizing communication (0.9% vs 62.2% social actions) outperforms verbose coordination. Our interpretable rules demonstrate that cooperative norms can be discovered rather than prescribed.
