Optimal illness policy for an unethical daycare center
Lauren D Smith
TL;DR
This work analyzes whether daycare centers have a financial incentive to keep sick children in attendance by framing a modified SIR model that splits infected individuals into those who attend and those who stay home, with attendance fraction $a$ determining infectious contact. The center’s profit proxy is the cumulative time children spend at home, $T_h(\infty)=(1-a)R_\infty/\gamma$, maximized by solving $\frac{d T_h(\infty)}{d a}=0$, with $R_\infty$ linked to $a$ and $R_0=\beta/\gamma$ through a Lambert $W$ relation. Results show that the optimal attendance $a^*$ decreases toward zero as disease infectiousness increases, and higher $R_0$ diseases yield larger potential staffing savings, illustrating a structural incentive to propagate illness under certain assumptions. The paper discusses policy implications, including removing under-staffing and implementing paid sick leave to mitigate these incentives, and suggests model extensions (SEIR, stochasticity) for more realism. Code and data are provided to reproduce the analysis.
Abstract
While businesses are typically more profitable if their workers and communities are minimally exposed to diseases, the same is not true for daycare centers. Here it is shown that a daycare center could maximize its profits by maintaining a population of sick children within the center, with the intention to infect more children who then do not attend. Through a modification of the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model for disease spread we find the optimal number of sick children who should be kept within the center to maximize profits. We show that as disease infectiousness increases, the optimal attendance rate of sick children approaches zero, while the potential profit increases.
