Are Quantum Voting Protocols Practical?
Nitin Jha, Abhishek Parakh
TL;DR
Are Quantum Voting Protocols Practical? investigates whether quantum voting can deliver ballot secrecy and publicly verifiable tallies through quantum mechanics. It outlines core principles such as the no-cloning theorem, entanglement, and superposition, defines system roles and threat models, and categorizes protocols into entanglement-based with central tally, self-tallying, and authority-minimized implementations. It assesses real-world adoption by detailing implementation challenges—loss, noise, device imperfections, scalability, and coercion resistance—and concludes that near-term deployments are feasible only for small, well-controlled groups, with larger elections requiring advances in state distribution and device certification. The suggested path combines quantum tamper-evident distribution and anonymity with classical end-to-end practices and post-quantum authentication, outlining a pragmatic route toward hybrid quantum-classical election infrastructure.
Abstract
Quantum voting protocols aim to offer ballot secrecy and publicly verifiable tallies using physical guarantees from quantum mechanics, rather than relying solely on computational hardness. This article surveys whether such quantum voting protocols are practical. We begin by outlining core mathematical ideas such as the superposition principle, the no-cloning theorem, and quantum entanglement. We then define a common system and threat model, identifying key actors, trust assumptions, and security goals. Representative protocol families are reviewed, including entanglement-based schemes with central tallying, self-tallying designs that enable public verification, and authority-minimized approaches that certify untrusted devices through observable correlations. Finally, we evaluate implementation challenges, including loss, noise, device imperfections, scalability, and coercion resistance, and discuss realistic near-term deployment scenarios for small-scale elections.
