RIS-Enabled Spoofing Against Adversary Sensing: CRB-Maximizing Design and Decoying Analysis
Ioannis Gavras, Giuseppe Thadeu Freitas de Abreu, George C. Alexandropoulos
TL;DR
This work demonstrates how a RIS coated UE can deceive a monostatic radar by nulling the true reflection while creating a controllable decoy at a chosen angle. A compact RIS kernel model links the radar's angular response to the RIS phase profile, enabling CRB/Fisher information analysis that shows AoA accuracy scales with kernel power. The authors formulate and solve an RIS design using an alternating-projection approach to enforce deep nulls on the true AoA and maximize decoy gain, and they introduce the ρ-deception criterion and a decoy-angle score to quantify and guide deception. Numerical results confirm deep nulls at the true AoA and a pronounced decoy peak, making ML-based AoA estimation unreliable for the RIS-covered target, highlighting the practical potential and limits of RIS-enabled spoofing in ISAC contexts.
Abstract
This paper studies the capability of a Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (RIS), when transparently covering a User Equipment (UE), to deceive an adversary monostatic radar system. A compact RIS kernel model that explicitly links the radar's angular response to the RIS phase profile is introduced, enabling an analytical investigation of the Angle of Arrival (AoA) estimation accuracy with respect to the kernel's power. This model is also leveraged to formulate an RIS-based spoofing design with the dual objective to enforce strict nulls around the UE's true reflection AoA and maximize the channel gain towards a decoy direction. The RIS's deception capability is quantified using point-wise and angle-range robust criteria, and a configuration-independent placement score guiding decoy selection is proposed. Selected numerical results confirm deep nulls at the true reflection AoA together with a pronounced decoy peak, rendering maximum-likelihood sensing at the adversary radar unreliable.
