"Just in Time" World Modeling Supports Human Planning and Reasoning
Tony Chen, Sam Cheyette, Kelsey Allen, Joshua Tenenbaum, Kevin Smith
TL;DR
The paper tackles how humans reason and plan in complex environments despite cognitive limits. It introduces the Just-in-Time (JIT) model, which interleaves simulation with online encoding via a visual lookahead to build task-relevant construals $C \,\subseteq\, O$ while obeying a memory-forgetting rule $p(\text{forget } o) \propto t^{−\gamma}$. Compared to Value Guided Construal (VGC), JIT emphasizes need-based encoding rather than globally optimizing construal utility, and it is tested in grid-world planning and Plinko-like physical prediction tasks. Across planning and physics experiments, JIT better accounts for human memory and attention patterns and demonstrates efficient representations that support accurate predictions with limited encoding; the work suggests a general, scalable mechanism for cognitive construal formation with implications for AI and robotics. The findings highlight the potential of incremental construal construction as a robust strategy for managing cognitive load in real-world reasoning tasks, while noting limitations and directions for integrating prior knowledge and richer scene complexity.
Abstract
Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.
