A Security Framework for Chemical Functions
Frederik Walter, Hrishi Narayanan, Jessica Bariffi, Anne Lüscher, Rawad Bitar, Robert Grass, Antonia Wachter-Zeh, Zohar Yakhini
TL;DR
The paper addresses authenticating and deriving keys from physical chemical substrates by introducing chemical functions as a unifying, cryptography-inspired framework. It formalizes CFIs and security properties—robustness, unclonability, and unpredictability—via security games and analyzes two DNA-based instantiations, ORDNA and GSE, to provide quantitative guarantees under lab noise. The framework translates laboratory operations into cryptographic resources, enabling principled design, analysis, and comparison of chemical-based authentication and key-generation schemes with practical parameters. The results indicate that DNA-based chemical-function schemes can offer strong security guarantees, including asymptotic unclonability and unpredictability, supporting in-product authentication, distributed key generation, and secure material provenance with reproducible extraction techniques.
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce chemical functions, a unified framework that models chemical systems as noisy challenge--response primitives, and formalize the associated chemical function infrastructure. Building on the theory of physical functions, we rigorously define robustness, unclonability, and unpredictability for chemical functions in both finite and asymptotic regimes, and specify security games that capture the adversary's power and the security goals. We instantiate the framework with two existing DNA-based constructions (operable random DNA and Genomic Sequence Encryption) and derive quantitative bounds for robustness, unclonability, and unpredictability. Our analysis develops maximum-likelihood verification rules under sequencing noise and partial-edit models, and provides high-precision estimates based on binomial distributions to guide parameter selection. The framework, definitions, and analyses yield a reproducible methodology for designing chemically unclonable authentication mechanisms. We demonstrate applications to in-product authentication and to shared key generation using standard extraction techniques.
