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Robust Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Games

Angel Y. He, David Parker

TL;DR

This work tackles the verification of concurrent stochastic games under transition-uncertainty by introducing robust CSGs (RCSGs) and their interval subclass ICSGs. It develops a principled, worst-case verification framework that reduces robustness to standard CSG techniques via adversarial expansions, handling both finite/infinite horizons and zero-sum and nonzero-sum objectives. The authors define robust equilibria (RNE, RSWNE), prove key properties such as value equivalence and memoryless optimality, and provide concrete algorithms (RVI/RBI) plus inner optimization procedures, with and without explicit construction of expanded games. Implemented in PRISM-games and evaluated on large benchmarks, the approach shows zero-sum ICSGs scale comparably to non-robust CSGs, while nonzero-sum ICSGs remain tractable for sizable models, highlighting the practicality of robust multi-agent verification under transition uncertainty.

Abstract

Autonomous systems often operate in multi-agent settings and need to make concurrent, strategic decisions, typically in uncertain environments. Verification and control problems for these systems can be tackled with concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), but this model requires transition probabilities to be precisely specified - an unrealistic requirement in many real-world settings. We introduce *robust CSGs* and their subclass *interval CSGs* (ICSGs), which capture epistemic uncertainty about transition probabilities in CSGs. We propose a novel framework for *robust* verification of these models under worst-case assumptions about transition uncertainty. Specifically, we develop the underlying theoretical foundations and efficient algorithms, for finite- and infinite-horizon objectives in both zero-sum and nonzero-sum settings, the latter based on (social-welfare optimal) Nash equilibria. We build an implementation in the PRISM-games model checker and demonstrate the feasibility of robust verification of ICSGs across a selection of large benchmarks.

Robust Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Games

TL;DR

This work tackles the verification of concurrent stochastic games under transition-uncertainty by introducing robust CSGs (RCSGs) and their interval subclass ICSGs. It develops a principled, worst-case verification framework that reduces robustness to standard CSG techniques via adversarial expansions, handling both finite/infinite horizons and zero-sum and nonzero-sum objectives. The authors define robust equilibria (RNE, RSWNE), prove key properties such as value equivalence and memoryless optimality, and provide concrete algorithms (RVI/RBI) plus inner optimization procedures, with and without explicit construction of expanded games. Implemented in PRISM-games and evaluated on large benchmarks, the approach shows zero-sum ICSGs scale comparably to non-robust CSGs, while nonzero-sum ICSGs remain tractable for sizable models, highlighting the practicality of robust multi-agent verification under transition uncertainty.

Abstract

Autonomous systems often operate in multi-agent settings and need to make concurrent, strategic decisions, typically in uncertain environments. Verification and control problems for these systems can be tackled with concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), but this model requires transition probabilities to be precisely specified - an unrealistic requirement in many real-world settings. We introduce *robust CSGs* and their subclass *interval CSGs* (ICSGs), which capture epistemic uncertainty about transition probabilities in CSGs. We propose a novel framework for *robust* verification of these models under worst-case assumptions about transition uncertainty. Specifically, we develop the underlying theoretical foundations and efficient algorithms, for finite- and infinite-horizon objectives in both zero-sum and nonzero-sum settings, the latter based on (social-welfare optimal) Nash equilibria. We build an implementation in the PRISM-games model checker and demonstrate the feasibility of robust verification of ICSGs across a selection of large benchmarks.
Paper Structure (14 sections, 8 theorems, 8 equations, 2 figures, 2 tables, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 14 sections, 8 theorems, 8 equations, 2 figures, 2 tables, 1 algorithm.

Key Result

theorem thmcountertheorem

From any $s \in S$, $V_{\mathcal{G}}(s)$ is invariant under the player-first or nature-first semantics:

Figures (2)

  • Figure 1: Total verification time relative to CSG baseline in the first nonzero-sum Robot coordination case study, which requires $\epsilon<0.05$.
  • Figure 2: ICSG values over game size in the Intrusion Detection case study, under two resolutions of uncertainty: adversarial (solid lines) and controlled by coalition 1 (dashed).

Theorems & Definitions (19)

  • definition thmcounterdefinition: MDP
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: RMDP
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: CSG
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: Reward structure
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: RCSG
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: Robust determinacy and optimality
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: Subgame-perfect $\varepsilon$-RNE
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: RSWNE
  • definition thmcounterdefinition: ICSG
  • theorem thmcountertheorem: Player/nature-first Value Equivalence
  • ...and 9 more