Explicit Reward Mechanisms for Local Flexibility in Renewable Energy Communities
Thomas Stegen, Julien Allard, Noé Diffels, François Vallée, Mevludin Glavic, Zacharie De Grève, Bertrand Cornélusse
TL;DR
This paper tackles maximizing local arbitrage in Renewable Energy Communities while preserving user privacy by introducing a decentralized, iterative coordination between a Community Operator and members. Its method, ECFlexIt, splits decisions between participants and CO, and uses regulatory Keys of Repartition (KoRs) to fairly allocate activated flexibility, with three concrete KoR rules (Equal, Prorate, Cascade). The study models EVs, water boilers, and heat pumps as storage-like assets and validates on a 20-household case showing the decentralized approach closely matches centralized optima, with deviations as low as around 3.22–3.5% and notable grid efficiency gains when flexibility is activated. The work demonstrates that privacy-preserving, incentive-aware coordination can unlock substantial local flexibility, especially from thermal loads, while keeping computational and data-sharing overhead manageable for real-world deployment.
Abstract
Incentivizing flexible consumption of end-users is key to maximizing the value of local exchanges within Renewable Energy Communities. If centralized coordination for flexible resources planning raises concerns regarding data privacy and fair benefits distribution, state-of-the-art approaches (e.g., bi-level, ADMM) often face computational complexity and convexity challenges, limiting the precision of embedded flexible models. This work proposes an iterative resolution procedure to solve the decentralized flexibility planning with a central operator as a coordinator within a community. The community operator asks for upward or downward flexibility depending on the global needs, while members can individually react with an offer for flexible capacity. This approach ensures individual optimality while converging towards a global optimum, as validated on a 20-member domestic case study for which the gap in terms of collective bill is not more than 3.5% between the decentralized and centralized coordination schemes.
