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When the Base Station Flies: Rethinking Security for UAV-Based 6G Networks

Ammar El Falou

TL;DR

The paper addresses security challenges in UAV-based 6G non-terrestrial networks by classifying attack surfaces into impersonation threats (rogue UAV-BS) and direct UAV-BS attacks, including emergency-alert spoofing, handover manipulation, RRC signaling storms, backhaul jamming, and GNSS spoofing. It argues that UAVs’ energy and processing constraints, wireless backhaul, and mobility expand the threat surface and necessitate lightweight, mobility-aware defenses such as anomaly detection, multi-constellation GNSS fusion, and cross-checks with terrestrial networks, all integrated into standards. Key contributions include analyzing emergency-alert spoofing risks, outlining handover attack vectors, detailing DoS via RRC storms with detection baselines using $N_r$ vs $N_s$, and proposing mitigation avenues like position verification and cooperative defense. The work underscores the practical significance of securing air-ground 6G architectures for reliable emergency communications and disaster resilience, guiding standardization and cross-disciplinary collaboration.

Abstract

The integration of non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) into 6G systems is crucial for achieving seamless global coverage, particularly in underserved and disaster-prone regions. Among NTN platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are especially promising due to their rapid deployability. However, this shift from fixed, wired base stations (BSs) to mobile, wireless, energy-constrained UAV-BSs introduces unique security challenges. Their central role in emergency communications makes them attractive candidates for emergency alert spoofing. Their limited computing and energy resources make them more vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and their dependence on wireless backhaul links and GNSS navigation exposes them to jamming, interception, and spoofing. Furthermore, UAV mobility opens new attack vectors such as malicious handover manipulation. This paper identifies several attack surfaces of UAV-BS systems and outlines principles for mitigating their threats.

When the Base Station Flies: Rethinking Security for UAV-Based 6G Networks

TL;DR

The paper addresses security challenges in UAV-based 6G non-terrestrial networks by classifying attack surfaces into impersonation threats (rogue UAV-BS) and direct UAV-BS attacks, including emergency-alert spoofing, handover manipulation, RRC signaling storms, backhaul jamming, and GNSS spoofing. It argues that UAVs’ energy and processing constraints, wireless backhaul, and mobility expand the threat surface and necessitate lightweight, mobility-aware defenses such as anomaly detection, multi-constellation GNSS fusion, and cross-checks with terrestrial networks, all integrated into standards. Key contributions include analyzing emergency-alert spoofing risks, outlining handover attack vectors, detailing DoS via RRC storms with detection baselines using vs , and proposing mitigation avenues like position verification and cooperative defense. The work underscores the practical significance of securing air-ground 6G architectures for reliable emergency communications and disaster resilience, guiding standardization and cross-disciplinary collaboration.

Abstract

The integration of non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) into 6G systems is crucial for achieving seamless global coverage, particularly in underserved and disaster-prone regions. Among NTN platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are especially promising due to their rapid deployability. However, this shift from fixed, wired base stations (BSs) to mobile, wireless, energy-constrained UAV-BSs introduces unique security challenges. Their central role in emergency communications makes them attractive candidates for emergency alert spoofing. Their limited computing and energy resources make them more vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and their dependence on wireless backhaul links and GNSS navigation exposes them to jamming, interception, and spoofing. Furthermore, UAV mobility opens new attack vectors such as malicious handover manipulation. This paper identifies several attack surfaces of UAV-BS systems and outlines principles for mitigating their threats.
Paper Structure (11 sections, 4 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 11 sections, 4 figures, 1 table.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Problem Context and Motivation
  3. Attacks and Defenses on UAV-based Cellular Systems
  4. Impersonating UAV Base Stations
  5. Spoofing of Emergency Alerts
  6. Handovers manipulation
  7. Attacks on UAV-BSs
  8. DoS via RRC storm attacks
  9. Jamming and GNSS spoofing
  10. Position and Call to Action
  11. Conclusion

Figures (4)

  • Figure 1: UAV-BS use cases.
  • Figure 2: Spoofing of emergency alerts
  • Figure 3: RRC Signaling Storm Attack
  • Figure 4: Security challenges introduced by UAV-BS: the environment, backhaul, positioning, and energy-computational constraints jointly expand the attack surface.