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Security Boundaries of Quantum Key Reuse: A Quantitative Evaluation Method for QKD Key Rotation Interval and Security Benefits Combined with Block Ciphers

Xiaoming Chen, Haoze Chen, Fei Xu, Meifeng Gao, Jianguo Xie, Cheng Ye, An Hua, Jiao Zhao, Minghan Li, Feilong Li, Yajun Miao, Wei Qi

TL;DR

This paper addresses the security implications of reusing quantum keys in hybrid quantum-classical encryption by developing a precise model to compute the QKD key rotation interval for CTR, CBC, and ECBC-MAC modes. It introduces a concrete-security framework that combines QKD information-theoretic security with the computational security of block ciphers, enabling explicit calculation of the maximum number of files ($Q^*$) that can be encrypted per key and the security gains from uniform key rotations. The authors show that, for an 80-bit target, uniformly performing $k$ key rotations yields a security-strength increase between $\log_{2} k$ and $2\log_{2} k$ bits, with concrete examples using SM4 (128-bit) illustrating $Q^*$ values and data-volume limits across modes; CTR in particular approaches nearly 2 additional bits for $k=2$. The framework provides a practical cost–benefit evaluation for deploying QKD-integrated cryptosystems, including explicit parameter settings and a formula for balancing key cost against security gains, thereby guiding real-world engineering deployments of quantum-secure encryption.

Abstract

With the rapid development of quantum computing, classical cryptography systems are facing increasing security threats, making it urgent to build architectures resilient to quantum attacks. Although Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology provides information-theoretic security, its limited bandwidth requires it to be combined with classical cryptography-particularly block ciphers such as AES and SM4-in practical deployments.However, when a single key is used to process multiple multi-block files, the resulting reduction in security strength has not yet been systematically quantified.In this work, we focus on the use of both QKD keys and block ciphers, and construct a precise calculation model for the key rotation interval. We further propose a quantitative method to evaluate the security benefit of using QKD keys for block cipher. Building on concrete security models and the security properties of various block cipher modes (CTR, CBC, and ECBC-MAC), we derive the maximum number of files that can be safely encrypted under a single key, denoted Q*, and quantify the benefits of key rotation interval in enhancing security levels. Using SM4 as a case study, our results show that, under an 80-bit security target, uniformly performing k key rotations can increase the security strength by log2(k) to 2log2(k) bits. This study provides theoretical support and a basis for parameter optimization for the integrated application of QKD keys with classical cryptographic algorithms and the engineering deployment of cryptographic systems.

Security Boundaries of Quantum Key Reuse: A Quantitative Evaluation Method for QKD Key Rotation Interval and Security Benefits Combined with Block Ciphers

TL;DR

This paper addresses the security implications of reusing quantum keys in hybrid quantum-classical encryption by developing a precise model to compute the QKD key rotation interval for CTR, CBC, and ECBC-MAC modes. It introduces a concrete-security framework that combines QKD information-theoretic security with the computational security of block ciphers, enabling explicit calculation of the maximum number of files () that can be encrypted per key and the security gains from uniform key rotations. The authors show that, for an 80-bit target, uniformly performing key rotations yields a security-strength increase between and bits, with concrete examples using SM4 (128-bit) illustrating values and data-volume limits across modes; CTR in particular approaches nearly 2 additional bits for . The framework provides a practical cost–benefit evaluation for deploying QKD-integrated cryptosystems, including explicit parameter settings and a formula for balancing key cost against security gains, thereby guiding real-world engineering deployments of quantum-secure encryption.

Abstract

With the rapid development of quantum computing, classical cryptography systems are facing increasing security threats, making it urgent to build architectures resilient to quantum attacks. Although Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology provides information-theoretic security, its limited bandwidth requires it to be combined with classical cryptography-particularly block ciphers such as AES and SM4-in practical deployments.However, when a single key is used to process multiple multi-block files, the resulting reduction in security strength has not yet been systematically quantified.In this work, we focus on the use of both QKD keys and block ciphers, and construct a precise calculation model for the key rotation interval. We further propose a quantitative method to evaluate the security benefit of using QKD keys for block cipher. Building on concrete security models and the security properties of various block cipher modes (CTR, CBC, and ECBC-MAC), we derive the maximum number of files that can be safely encrypted under a single key, denoted Q*, and quantify the benefits of key rotation interval in enhancing security levels. Using SM4 as a case study, our results show that, under an 80-bit security target, uniformly performing k key rotations can increase the security strength by log2(k) to 2log2(k) bits. This study provides theoretical support and a basis for parameter optimization for the integrated application of QKD keys with classical cryptographic algorithms and the engineering deployment of cryptographic systems.
Paper Structure (18 sections, 41 equations, 7 figures, 1 table)