Neutralization of IMU-Based GPS Spoofing Detection using external IMU sensor and feedback methodology

TL;DR

This work addresses the vulnerability of autonomous-vehicle position estimates to GPS spoofing by targeting IMU-based detection. It introduces a realistic attack model in which an external IMU attached to the vehicle enables the attacker to infer the target's internal state and perform GPS spoofing, while EKF sensor fusion underpins the attack’s integration with the target’s estimates. A novel feedback spoofing methodology is proposed to keep spoofed values within the target’s internal state range by incorporating previously injected signals, enabling continuous, stealthy spoofing. Experimental validation on PX4 with MAVLink demonstrates the attacker’s ability to evade IMU-based anomaly detection and maintain coherent trajectories, with velocity spoofing showing strong tracking of internal dynamics. The results underscore the practicality of such attacks and motivate the development of defenses beyond internal IMU cues for securing autonomous navigation systems.

Abstract

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) refer to systems capable of perceiving their states and moving without human intervention. Among the factors required for autonomous decision-making in mobility, positional awareness of the vehicle itself is the most critical. Accordingly, extensive research has been conducted on defense mechanisms against GPS spoofing attacks, which threaten AVs by disrupting position recognition. Among these, detection methods based on internal IMU sensors are regarded as some of the most effective. In this paper, we propose a spoofing attack system designed to neutralize IMU sensor-based detection. First, we present an attack modeling approach for bypassing such detection. Then, based on EKF sensor fusion, we experimentally analyze both the impact of GPS spoofing values on the internal target system and how our proposed methodology reduces anomaly detection within the target system. To this end, this paper proposes an attack model that performs GPS spoofing by stealing internal dynamic state information using an external IMU sensor, and the experimental results demonstrate that attack values can be injected without being detected.

Figures (10)

• Figure 1: Position estimation using sensor fusion with GPS and IMU.
• Figure 2: Comparison between the proposed GPS spoofing attack model in this paper, which attaches a external spoofing system to AVs for direct spoofing, and the existing attack model where the attacker sends spoofing signals remotely from a distance.
• Figure 3: GPS spoofing system for Neutralization IMU-based Detection.
• Figure 4: Experimental environment using MAVLink with GPS spoofing.
• Figure 5: When the attack system transmits only a fixed spoofing value, changes of the target system's test ratio and the cumulated sum of test ratio.