Concept Generalization in Humans and Large Language Models: Insights from the Number Game
Arghavan Bazigaran, Hansem Sohn
TL;DR
The paper investigates how humans and LLMs generalize mathematical concepts using the number game, adopting a Bayesian framework as a normative benchmark. It contrasts human flexibility in combining rule-based and similarity-based concepts with GPT’s apparent emphasis on rule-based inferences, revealing poorer one-shot generalization and greater reliance on multiple examples for LLMs. By fitting a Bayesian model and testing variants (BinL, MAP, MaxL), the study shows humans align closely with Bayesian predictions, while GPT’s generalization is better captured by likelihood-driven, MaxL-like strategies and a higher rule bias. These findings illuminate fundamental differences in mathematical reasoning between humans and LLMs and suggest directions for improving LLM inductive biases through targeted training and prompting to foster richer numerical concept representations.
Abstract
We compare human and large language model (LLM) generalization in the number game, a concept inference task. Using a Bayesian model as an analytical framework, we examined the inductive biases and inference strategies of humans and LLMs. The Bayesian model captured human behavior better than LLMs in that humans flexibly infer rule-based and similarity-based concepts, whereas LLMs rely more on mathematical rules. Humans also demonstrated a few-shot generalization, even from a single example, while LLMs required more samples to generalize. These contrasts highlight the fundamental differences in how humans and LLMs infer and generalize mathematical concepts.
