Impact analysis of hidden faults in nonlinear control systems using output-to-output gain
Ruslan Seifullaev, André Teixeira
TL;DR
The paper tackles the vulnerability of nonlinear networked control systems to hidden faults and attacks by extending the output-to-output gain ($OOG$) concept to nonlinearities that satisfy quadratic constraints. It develops absolute stability conditions using a generalized Yakubovich criterion and provides computationally efficient LMI-based bounds for $OOG$ via dissipativity theory, complemented by frequency-domain tests. A key contribution is showing how stealthy nonlinear sensor attacks can significantly increase $OOG$, even under residual-based detection. The results offer practical tools for assessing and mitigating the impact of hidden faults in nonlinear NCSs, with potential extensions to more complex attack models and time-delay effects.
Abstract
Networked control systems (NCSs) are vulnerable to faults and hidden malfunctions in communication channels that can degrade performance or even destabilize the closed loop. Classical metrics in robust control and fault detection typically treat impact and detectability separately, whereas the output-to-output gain (OOG) provides a unified measure of both. While existing results have been limited to linear systems, this paper extends the OOG framework to nonlinear NCSs with quadratically constrained nonlinearities, considering false-injection attacks that can also manipulate sensor measurements through nonlinear transformations. Specifically, we provide computationally efficient linear matrix inequality conditions and complementary frequency-domain tests that yield explicit upper bounds on the OOG of this class of nonlinear systems. Furthermore, we derive frequency-domain conditions for absolute stability of closed-loop systems, generalizing the Yakubovich quadratic criterion.
