Video Deepfake Abuse: How Company Choices Predictably Shape Misuse Patterns
Max Kamachee, Stephen Casper, Michelle L. Ding, Rui-Jie Yew, Anka Reuel, Stella Biderman, Dylan Hadfield-Menell
TL;DR
The paper examines how open-weight AI video models and distribution platforms contribute to non-consensual and CSAM-related harms, drawing parallels with the 2022 image-generation surge. It analyzes historical breakthroughs, current video-generation ecosystems, and safeguards literature to show that a small set of models and platforms drive NSFW content, and that risk management by developers and distributors can meaningfully curb harm. It argues for data curation, post-training unlearning, evaluations, and staged deployments, while noting widespread under-reporting of mitigations by developers and uneven platform enforcement. The findings inform policy and industry practices, highlighting that proactive risk mitigation can reduce misuse without foreclosing the benefits of powerful open-weight models.
Abstract
In 2022, AI image generators crossed a key threshold, enabling much more efficient and dynamic production of photorealistic deepfake images than before. This enabled opportunities for creative and positive uses of these models. However, it also enabled unprecedented opportunities for the low-effort creation of AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (AIG-NCII), including AI-generated child sexual abuse material (AIG-CSAM). Empirically, these harms were principally enabled by a small number of models that were trained on web data with pornographic content, released with open weights, and insufficiently safeguarded. In this paper, we observe ways in which the same patterns are emerging with video generation models in 2025. Specifically, we analyze how a small number of open-weight AI video generation models have become the dominant tools for videorealistic AIG-NCII video generation. We then analyze the literature on model safeguards and conclude that (1) developers who openly release the weights of capable video generation models without appropriate data curation and/or post-training safeguards foreseeably contribute to mitigatable downstream harm, and (2) model distribution platforms that do not proactively moderate individual misuse or models designed for AIG-NCII foreseeably amplify this harm. While there are no perfect defenses against AIG-NCII and AIG-CSAM from open-weight AI models, we argue that risk management by model developers and distributors, informed by emerging safeguard techniques, will substantially affect the future ease of creating AIG-NCII and AIG-CSAM with generative AI video tools.
