How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach

TL;DR

The paper addresses how conflict-averse centrism influences dynamics in morally asymmetric polarization, proposing a minimal three-strategy evolutionary-game model with replicator dynamics to encode asymmetric payoffs reflecting civility norms and norm-breaking. It identifies two global regimes: a heteroclinic cycle that yields recurrent authoritarian resurgence and a stable centrist–fascist coalition excluding resistance, depending on how the centrists and fascists interact along the C–F edge. The findings show that conflict-averse centrism can unintentionally facilitate authoritarian persistence, challenging the notion that resistance dominates when it faces fascism in isolation and highlighting the political risks of framing polarization as a symmetric problem. The work connects empirical insights on protest backlash and civility norms to formal dynamics, offering a mechanistic account of how third-party reactions can reshape democratic resilience in polarized settings.

Abstract

We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes -- cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist--authoritarian coalition excluding resistance -- depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.