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Quantization Blindspots: How Model Compression Breaks Backdoor Defenses

Rohan Pandey, Eric Ye

TL;DR

The paper addresses the gap between backdoor defenses evaluated on FP32 models and real-world deployment where models are quantized. It presents a systematic benchmark across FP32, INT8 dynamic, and INT4 simulated quantization for five defenses on two datasets under a canonical BadNet attack. Key findings show that INT8 quantization nullifies all defenses while backdoors retain high attack success rates, with INT4 exhibiting dataset-dependent defense efficacy. The work highlights the mismatch between FP32-focused evaluation and deployment reality, urging compression-aware defense design, and provides a benchmark and actionable recommendations for practitioners.

Abstract

Backdoor attacks embed input-dependent malicious behavior into neural networks while preserving high clean accuracy, making them a persistent threat for deployed ML systems. At the same time, real-world deployments almost never serve full-precision models: post-training quantization to INT8 or lower precision is now standard practice for reducing memory and latency. This work asks a simple question: how do existing backdoor defenses behave under standard quantization pipelines? We conduct a systematic empirical study of five representative defenses across three precision settings (FP32, INT8 dynamic, INT4 simulated) and two standard vision benchmarks using a canonical BadNet attack. We observe that INT8 quantization reduces the detection rate of all evaluated defenses to 0% while leaving attack success rates above 99%. For INT4, we find a pronounced dataset dependence: Neural Cleanse remains effective on GTSRB but fails on CIFAR-10, even though backdoors continue to survive quantization with attack success rates above 90%. Our results expose a mismatch between how defenses are commonly evaluated (on FP32 models) and how models are actually deployed (in quantized form), and they highlight quantization robustness as a necessary axis in future evaluations and designs of backdoor defenses.

Quantization Blindspots: How Model Compression Breaks Backdoor Defenses

TL;DR

The paper addresses the gap between backdoor defenses evaluated on FP32 models and real-world deployment where models are quantized. It presents a systematic benchmark across FP32, INT8 dynamic, and INT4 simulated quantization for five defenses on two datasets under a canonical BadNet attack. Key findings show that INT8 quantization nullifies all defenses while backdoors retain high attack success rates, with INT4 exhibiting dataset-dependent defense efficacy. The work highlights the mismatch between FP32-focused evaluation and deployment reality, urging compression-aware defense design, and provides a benchmark and actionable recommendations for practitioners.

Abstract

Backdoor attacks embed input-dependent malicious behavior into neural networks while preserving high clean accuracy, making them a persistent threat for deployed ML systems. At the same time, real-world deployments almost never serve full-precision models: post-training quantization to INT8 or lower precision is now standard practice for reducing memory and latency. This work asks a simple question: how do existing backdoor defenses behave under standard quantization pipelines? We conduct a systematic empirical study of five representative defenses across three precision settings (FP32, INT8 dynamic, INT4 simulated) and two standard vision benchmarks using a canonical BadNet attack. We observe that INT8 quantization reduces the detection rate of all evaluated defenses to 0% while leaving attack success rates above 99%. For INT4, we find a pronounced dataset dependence: Neural Cleanse remains effective on GTSRB but fails on CIFAR-10, even though backdoors continue to survive quantization with attack success rates above 90%. Our results expose a mismatch between how defenses are commonly evaluated (on FP32 models) and how models are actually deployed (in quantized form), and they highlight quantization robustness as a necessary axis in future evaluations and designs of backdoor defenses.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 28 sections, 2 equations, 3 tables, 1 algorithm.