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Barriers to AI Adoption: Image Concerns at Work

David Almog

TL;DR

This study addresses how image concerns shape AI adoption in the workplace by running a field experiment on Upwork with 450 US-based data annotators. A two-stage task pairs unaided judgments with AI recommendations and varies whether AI reliance is observable to an HR evaluator, enabling causal inference about signaling effects on behavior and performance. The findings show that making AI reliance observable reduces AI adoption by about $4.3$ percentage points and lowers accuracy by roughly $3.4\%$, with workers spending more time on initial decisions but not improving final accuracy. A novel incentive-compatible public-feedback mechanism reveals that workers fear signaling low confidence in their own judgment when AI use is visible, and information-based reassurance does not alleviate this effect; these image concerns persist even under controlled evaluation criteria, suggesting substantial practical barriers to AI–human collaboration. The results imply that improving AI productivity requires addressing the social meanings attached to AI use or redesigning workflows to reduce visibility, and the study contributes a new platform-based signaling method for studying signaling motives in digital labor markets.

Abstract

Concerns about how workers are perceived can deter effective collaboration with artificial intelligence (AI). In a field experiment on a large online labor market, I hired 450 U.S.-based remote workers to complete an image-categorization job assisted by AI recommendations. Workers were incentivized by the prospect of a contract extension based on an HR evaluator's feedback. I find that workers adopt AI recommendations at lower rates when their reliance on AI is visible to the evaluator, resulting in a measurable decline in task performance. The effects are present despite a conservative design in which workers know that the evaluator is explicitly instructed to assess expected accuracy on the same AI-assisted task. This reduction in AI reliance persists even when the evaluator is reassured about workers' strong performance history on the platform, underscoring how difficult these concerns are to alleviate. Leveraging the platform's public feedback feature, I introduce a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method showing that workers fear heavy reliance on AI signals a lack of confidence in their own judgment, a trait they view as essential when collaborating with AI.

Barriers to AI Adoption: Image Concerns at Work

TL;DR

This study addresses how image concerns shape AI adoption in the workplace by running a field experiment on Upwork with 450 US-based data annotators. A two-stage task pairs unaided judgments with AI recommendations and varies whether AI reliance is observable to an HR evaluator, enabling causal inference about signaling effects on behavior and performance. The findings show that making AI reliance observable reduces AI adoption by about percentage points and lowers accuracy by roughly , with workers spending more time on initial decisions but not improving final accuracy. A novel incentive-compatible public-feedback mechanism reveals that workers fear signaling low confidence in their own judgment when AI use is visible, and information-based reassurance does not alleviate this effect; these image concerns persist even under controlled evaluation criteria, suggesting substantial practical barriers to AI–human collaboration. The results imply that improving AI productivity requires addressing the social meanings attached to AI use or redesigning workflows to reduce visibility, and the study contributes a new platform-based signaling method for studying signaling motives in digital labor markets.

Abstract

Concerns about how workers are perceived can deter effective collaboration with artificial intelligence (AI). In a field experiment on a large online labor market, I hired 450 U.S.-based remote workers to complete an image-categorization job assisted by AI recommendations. Workers were incentivized by the prospect of a contract extension based on an HR evaluator's feedback. I find that workers adopt AI recommendations at lower rates when their reliance on AI is visible to the evaluator, resulting in a measurable decline in task performance. The effects are present despite a conservative design in which workers know that the evaluator is explicitly instructed to assess expected accuracy on the same AI-assisted task. This reduction in AI reliance persists even when the evaluator is reassured about workers' strong performance history on the platform, underscoring how difficult these concerns are to alleviate. Leveraging the platform's public feedback feature, I introduce a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method showing that workers fear heavy reliance on AI signals a lack of confidence in their own judgment, a trait they view as essential when collaborating with AI.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 30 sections, 1 theorem, 16 equations, 37 figures, 4 tables.

Key Result

Proposition 1

(i) Scoring when AI reliance is not observed. If the worker maximizes $S_c(a)$ with $S_c'(a)> 0$, the accuracy-maximizing policy is the cutoff rule with (ii) Scoring with observable AI reliance. Suppose the worker maximizes $S_t(a,r)$, where $S_t$ is continuously differentiable and $\partial S_t/\partial a>0$. Then an optimal policy is again a cutoff rule: Here $\lambda$ is the evaluator’s shado

Figures (37)

  • Figure 1: Upwork Job Posting
  • Figure 2: Experiment Design
  • Figure 3: Task interface showing the initial choice and AI recommendation stages.
  • Figure 4: Threshold Decision Rule.
  • Figure 5: Accuracy Distributions
  • ...and 32 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (1)

  • Proposition 1: Threshold optimality