Circulation of Elites in an Adaptive Network Model
Alexander Jochim, Stefan Bornholdt
TL;DR
We study elite circulation using an adaptive network where $N$ agents carry ideological states $\sigma_i$ and form directed power links, with power dynamics governed by local rules. The framework combines cumulative advantage and intra-elite conflict, controlled by $α$ (new colors) and $ε$ (random links), to produce punctuated equilibria and a phase transition toward a disordered elite configuration. Key results include a star-core structural motif, a broad $P(k)$ in-degree distribution for small $ε$, and the proxy $g_{\max}^{\mathrm{top10}}$ that Granger-causes the dominant color fraction and offers predictive early-warning signals via $φ_{\mathrm{in}}$. These findings link microscopic local interactions to macroscopic political stability patterns and suggest observable proxies for real-world elite dynamics, with avenues for extensions such as elite overproduction, wealth coupling, and self-organized criticality.
Abstract
Societies experience politically stable and unstable phases along history, whereas political power is usually passed to new elite groups by these changes. Structural dynamics of the elites in a society have been proposed to be one of the core drivers shaping long term behavior. As current models and data are rather macroscopic, the emergence of macroscopic behavior from microscopic dynamics is largely unclear. Here, we introduce an adaptive network model of directed links representing political power and competing political ideas, based on local dynamical rules, only. The model is based on two socially motivated behaviors: the cumulative advantage effect of political power and intra-elite conflict. We observe punctuated equilibria as an emergent behavior and find a phase transition towards a disordered phase. We define an advance warning measure for elite collapse and find that the states of only a few largest nodes are suitable as a proxy with predictive information.
