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The Publication Choice Problem

Haichuan Wang, Yifan Wu, Haifeng Xu

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Publication Choice Problem, a game-theoretic model in which researchers of heterogeneous types strategically allocate publications across multiple venues with distinct costs and impacts, generating a co-evolution of venue impact factors. It proves a pure-strategy equilibrium exists and is unique in the binary-type setting, and provides closed-form best-response characterizations via a $\beta$-norm utility and the Monotone Cost Ratio condition. A key finding is that the number of publications at the top venue is monotone in researcher type, while total publications need not be, and that spotlight labeling can produce threshold effects that shift impacts across the research community. The study further analyzes spotlight mechanisms, showing labeling can either depress or elevate overall venue impacts depending on competitiveness, supported by simulations. These results illuminate how signaling and cost structures shape publication ecosystems and venue rankings, with practical implications for agency-design and policy in scholarly publishing.

Abstract

Researchers strategically choose where to submit their work in order to maximize its impact, and these publication decisions in turn determine venues' impact factors. To analyze how individual publication choices both respond to and shape venue impact, we introduce a game-theoretic framework, coined the Publication Choice Problem, that captures this two-way interplay. We show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the Publication Choice Problem and its uniqueness under binary researcher types. Our characterizations of the equilibrium properties offer insights about what publication behaviors better indicate a researcher's impact level. Through equilibrium analysis, we further investigate how labeling papers with ``spotlight'' affects the impact factor of venues in the research community. Our analysis shows that competitive venue labeling top papers with ``spotlight'' may decrease the overall impact of other venues in the community, while less competitive venues with ``spotlight'' labeling have the opposite impact.

The Publication Choice Problem

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Publication Choice Problem, a game-theoretic model in which researchers of heterogeneous types strategically allocate publications across multiple venues with distinct costs and impacts, generating a co-evolution of venue impact factors. It proves a pure-strategy equilibrium exists and is unique in the binary-type setting, and provides closed-form best-response characterizations via a -norm utility and the Monotone Cost Ratio condition. A key finding is that the number of publications at the top venue is monotone in researcher type, while total publications need not be, and that spotlight labeling can produce threshold effects that shift impacts across the research community. The study further analyzes spotlight mechanisms, showing labeling can either depress or elevate overall venue impacts depending on competitiveness, supported by simulations. These results illuminate how signaling and cost structures shape publication ecosystems and venue rankings, with practical implications for agency-design and policy in scholarly publishing.

Abstract

Researchers strategically choose where to submit their work in order to maximize its impact, and these publication decisions in turn determine venues' impact factors. To analyze how individual publication choices both respond to and shape venue impact, we introduce a game-theoretic framework, coined the Publication Choice Problem, that captures this two-way interplay. We show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the Publication Choice Problem and its uniqueness under binary researcher types. Our characterizations of the equilibrium properties offer insights about what publication behaviors better indicate a researcher's impact level. Through equilibrium analysis, we further investigate how labeling papers with ``spotlight'' affects the impact factor of venues in the research community. Our analysis shows that competitive venue labeling top papers with ``spotlight'' may decrease the overall impact of other venues in the community, while less competitive venues with ``spotlight'' labeling have the opposite impact.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 48 sections, 24 theorems, 57 equations, 4 figures, 8 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. The Science of Science.
  4. Large Population Games.
  5. A Model of Publication Choice
  6. Best Responses.
  7. The Equilibrium.
  8. Properties of Publication Choice Problem s
  9. Characterizing Researchers' Best Responses
  10. Natural Properties and Model Sanity Check
  11. Equilibrium Existence and Their Properties
  12. Is the number of publications monotone in impact?
  13. The Binary-Type Case: Equilibrium Uniqueness and Spotlight Effects
  14. Equilibrium Uniqueness
  15. Idea of the Characteristic Function
  16. ...and 33 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 3.1

Let $\bm{v}$ be the venue impact vector. Then the best response of any researcher of type $\theta_i$ can be characterized in closed-form as follows:

Figures (4)

  • Figure 1: Impact factors of regular sessions with and without a venue switching to spotlight labeling. Higher venue indices correspond to more competitive venues.
  • Figure 2: Venue Impacts in the Equilibrium Under Different Relative Cost Growth Rates
  • Figure 3: Figure \ref{['fig:venue-1-different-sr']}-\ref{['fig:venue-3-different-sr']}
  • Figure 4: CVPR Spotlight and Regular Session Citation Data Comparison

Theorems & Definitions (44)

  • Definition 1: Equilibrium with a Continuum of Researchers
  • Lemma 3.1
  • Proposition 3.1
  • Proposition 3.1
  • Theorem 3.1
  • Proposition 3.1
  • proof : Proof Sketch
  • Definition 2: Characteristic Function
  • Lemma 4.1
  • Theorem 4.1
  • ...and 34 more