Enhancing All-to-X Backdoor Attacks with Optimized Target Class Mapping
Lei Wang, Yulong Tian, Hao Han, Fengyuan Xu
TL;DR
This work investigates All-to-X (A2X) backdoor attacks with multiple target classes and shows that existing defenses largely fail against A2X. It proposes a two-step attack design: similarity-based class grouping using a surrogate model to form $X$ source groups, and distance-aware target class assignment solved via Maximum Weight Bipartite Matching with the Hungarian algorithm to maximize group–target separation. The method yields substantial ASR improvements over baseline A2X attacks (up to ~28% on several datasets) while maintaining clean accuracy and demonstrating strong transferability across surrogate models and knowledge scenarios. The findings highlight a significant, under-explored security risk posed by A2X backdoors and provide a practical framework for robust mapping optimization, underscoring the need for defenses that account for multi-target backdoors.
Abstract
Backdoor attacks pose severe threats to machine learning systems, prompting extensive research in this area. However, most existing work focuses on single-target All-to-One (A2O) attacks, overlooking the more complex All-to-X (A2X) attacks with multiple target classes, which are often assumed to have low attack success rates. In this paper, we first demonstrate that A2X attacks are robust against state-of-the-art defenses. We then propose a novel attack strategy that enhances the success rate of A2X attacks while maintaining robustness by optimizing grouping and target class assignment mechanisms. Our method improves the attack success rate by up to 28%, with average improvements of 6.7%, 16.4%, 14.1% on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively. We anticipate that this study will raise awareness of A2X attacks and stimulate further research in this under-explored area. Our code is available at https://github.com/kazefjj/A2X-backdoor .
